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The author reviews research showing that repetitive thought (RT) can have constructive or unconstructive
consequences. The main unconstructive consequences of RT are (a) depression, (b) anxiety, and (c)
difficulties in physical health. The main constructive consequences of RT are (a) recovery from upsetting
and traumatic events, (b) adaptive preparation and anticipatory planning, (c) recovery from depression,
and (d) uptake of health-promoting behaviors. Several potential principles accounting for these distinct
consequences of RT are identified within this review: (a) the valence of thought content, (b) the
intrapersonal and situational context in which RT occurs, and (c) the level of construal (abstract vs.
concrete processing) adopted during RT. Of the existing models of RT, it is proposed that an elaborated
version of the control theory account provides the best theoretical framework to account for its distinct
consequences.
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Repetitive, prolonged, and recurrent thought about one’s self,
one’s concerns and one’s experiences is a mental process com-
monly engaged in by all people (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, &
Shafran, 2004). Such thinking bridges many topics within psychol-
ogy: social cognition, emotion, motivation, self-regulation, goal
attainment, stress, psychopathology, and mental health. Examples
of such thinking include worry, rumination, perseverative cogni-
tion, emotional processing, cognitive processing, mental simula-
tion, rehearsal, reflection, and problem solving (e.g., Martin &
Tesser, 1996; Mor & Winquist, 2002; Papageorgiou & Wells,
2004; Wyer, 1996). Across these constructs, there is considerable
similarity and overlap in theoretical conceptualizations and oper-
ational definitions. However, because these constructs have
emerged in distinct research domains, they are usually not equated
with one another and have rarely been considered together. More-
over, research has shown that these constructs have diverse out-
comes, such that repetitive thought (RT) can have both uncon-
structive and constructive consequences. For example, on one
hand, within the cognitive processing literature, RT about symp-
toms and upsetting events has been conceptualized as necessary
for people to come to terms with traumatic and upsetting events
(Horowitz, 1985; Pennebaker, 1997; Rachman, 1980; Tedeschi &
Calhoun, 2004). On the other hand, RT about symptoms and
upsetting events has been found to predict future depression (In-
gram, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000; Pyszczynski & Green-
berg, 1987) and poor recovery from traumatic and upsetting
events.
Accounting for the discrepant consequences of RT is critical in
understanding the underlying mechanisms of RT and is of obvious
applied and clinical value, in terms of improving recovery from
traumatic events and reducing vulnerability to anxiety and depres-
sion. Nonetheless, there have been few systematized attempts to
account for the distinct constructive and unconstructive outcomes
of RT (for initial suggestions, see Harvey et al., 2004; Martin &
Tesser, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004b; Segerstrom, Stanton, Al-
den, & Shortridge, 2003). Thus, the first aim of the current article
is to address this omission by reviewing and organizing the exten-
sive literature on the distinct consequences of RT in a coherent
way. The second aim is to identify principles and/or mechanisms
that could explain the distinct consequences of RT. The third aim
is to discuss existing models of RT in the light of this review to
determine which theory best accounts for the extant literature on
RT. I first define the constructs used in this review, including the
generic construct repetitive thought, as well as more specific
examples and classes of RT considered in this article. I then
evaluate the evidence relevant to making a distinction between
constructive and unconstructive consequences of RT before sum-
marizing and abstracting the key factors that emerge from this
review to account for these distinct consequences of RT. Finally,
I examine which of the existing models of RT best accounts for
this data.
What Is Meant by RT?
This review focuses on a number of thought processes that that
have been highlighted as important in the wider literature relevant
to self-regulation, psychopathology, and mental and physical
health. A property common to all of these constructs is the process
conceptualized by Segerstrom et al. (2003, p. 909) as “repetitive
thought,”, defined as the “process of thinking attentively, repeti-
tively or frequently about one’s self and one’s world,” which was
proposed to form “the core of a number of different models of
adjustment and maladjustment.” As the rest of this section makes
clear, these different classes of RT encompass a wide range of
conceptualizations, associated with both unconstructive and con-
structive consequences.
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http://www.apa.org/about/copyright.html.Depressive Rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991)
Nolen-Hoeksema defined depressive rumination as “behaviors
and thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symp-
toms and on the implications of these symptoms” (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569) and as “passively and repetitively focus-
ing on one’s symptoms of distress and the circumstances
surrounding these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Lar-
son, 1997). Nolen-Hoeksema’s Response Styles Theory (RST;
1991, 2000, 2004a, 2004b) hypothesized that depressive rumina-
tion is a particular response style to depressed mood, which is
causally implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression.
Depressive rumination is typically assessed on the Response Styles
Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), which
asks participants to endorse how much they ruminate in response
to sad or depressed mood (e.g., “When you feel sad, down or
depressed how often do you: Think ‘Why do I always react this
way?’”). A related questionnaire is the Rumination on Sadness
Scale (RSS; Conway, Csank, Holm, & Blake, 2000), which as-
sesses tendency to engage in RT when feeling sad, down, or blue
(e.g., “I repeatedly analyze and keep thinking about the reasons for
my sadness”).
Rumination (Martin & Tesser, 1996)
Rumination was defined as “a class of conscious thoughts that
revolve around a common instrumental theme and that recur in the
absence of immediate environmental demands requiring the
thoughts” (Martin & Tesser, 1996, p. 7). Within this conceptual-
ization, rumination is RT on a theme related to personal goals and
concerns, which can have either constructive or unconstructive
consequences, depending on whether the RT helps or hinders the
progress toward the unattained goal that triggered the rumination.
It is assessed with the Global Rumination Scale, which measures
the extent to which an individual dwells on problems and concerns
(W. D. McIntosh & Martin, 1992).
Worry
Worry has been defined as “a chain of thoughts and images,
negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable” and as “an
attempt to engage in mental problem-solving on an issue whose
outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more
negative outcomes” (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & Depree,
1983, p. 9). Worry typically involves RT about future potential
threat, imagined catastrophes, uncertainties, and risks (e.g., “What
if they have an accident?”). It is conceptualized as an attempt to
avoid negative events, to prepare for the worst, and to problem
solve, and it is linked to unconstructive outcomes including in-
creased negative affect, interference with cognitive function, and
disruptions to physiological processes (Borkovec, Ray, & Stober,
1998). However, worry is also proposed to serve a number of
constructive functions when it is objective, controllable, and brief
(Tallis & Eysenck, 1994): (a) an alarm function that interrupts
ongoing behavior and directs attention to an issue demanding
immediate priority; (b) a prompt function, keeping an individual
aware of potential unresolved threats; and (c) a preparation func-
tion, motivating an individual to prepare for difficulties and to
adopt adaptive behaviors that reduce potential threat. The Penn
State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; see Davey, 1993, for a dis-
cussion of this and other measures; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, &
Borkovec, 1990) assesses predisposition to worry (e.g., “I am
always worrying about something”).
Perseverative Cognition
Perseverative cognition has been defined as “the repeated or
chronic activation of the cognitive representation of one or more
psychological stressors” and is hypothesized to be a core feature of
worry, rumination, and other forms of RT (Brosschot, Gerin, &
Thayer, 2006; Brosschot, Pieper, & Thayer, 2005; Pieper &
Brosschot, 2005). Perseverative cognition is hypothesized to in-
volve repeated cognitive representations of a psychological prob-
lem or crisis, which acts to prolong the immediate psychological
and physiological responses to such life events and daily stressors
such that the body’s systems associated with stress (e.g., cardio-
vascular, hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal, and immune systems)
become chronically activated, leading to the development of dis-
ease (Brosschot et al., 2006; A. R. Schwartz et al., 2003).
Cognitive and Emotional Processing
Cognitive processing has been defined as the process of actively
thinking about a stressor, the thoughts and feelings it evokes, and
its implications for one’s life and future (J. E. Bower, Kemeny,
Taylor, & Fahey, 1998; Greenberg, 1995), thus falling within the
definition of RT (Silver, Boone, & Stone, 1983). Cognitive pro-
cessing accounts propose that RT about upsetting events, for
example in the form of persistent intrusions about the event, is part
of the process of attempting to resolve the discrepancy between
stressful events and core beliefs and assumptions (Greenberg,
1995; Horowitz, 1985; McCann, Sakheim, & Abrahamson, 1988;
D. N. Mcintosh, Silver, & Wortman, 1993). Such accounts hy-
pothesize that in response to a stressful experience, people think
repetitively about their experience in order to work it through,
make sense of it, and integrate it into their beliefs and assumptions
about the world (Harber & Pennebaker, 1992; Horowitz, 1986;
Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Tait & Silver, 1989). Similarly, RT is hy-
pothesized to be a central process in the development of posttrau-
matic growth, defined as “the experience of significant positive
change arising from the struggle with a major life crisis” (Calhoun,
Cann, Tedeschi, & McMillan, 2000, p. 521; see also Calhoun &
Tedeschi, 1998; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). Tedeschi and Cal-
houn (2004) proposed that major traumatic events challenge or
destroy key aspects of individuals’ beliefs and goals, producing
emotional distress, which in turn produces RT in order to resolve
the distress, leading to personal growth.
Emotional processing has been defined as volitional efforts to
acknowledge and understand the significance of one’s emotions
and is operationalized as persistent focus and analysis of feelings
(e.g., “I take time to figure out what I’m really feeling”; Stanton,
Danoff-Burg, et al., 2000; Stanton, Kirk, Cameron, & Danoff-
Burg, 2000). Emotional processing has been associated with both
constructive outcomes, such as better adjustment, and unconstruc-
tive outcomes, such as increased distress.
Planning, Problem Solving, and Mental Simulation
RT can also take the form of cognitive coping strategies, such as
anticipatory coping, planning, rehearsal, and problem solving.
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stages: definition or appraisal of the problem, generation of alter-
native solutions, selection of alternatives, implementing the chosen
solution, and evaluating its effectiveness (D’Zurilla & Goldfried,
1971), each of which could involve RT. Plan rehearsal involves
envisioning the steps or strategies one could use to achieve a
desired outcome and often involves repetitive mental rehearsing of
future actions and situations. Similarly, mental simulation has been
defined as the imaginative and imitative mental construction and
representation of some event or series of events (Taylor, Pham,
Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989). Repeated
mental simulation can be an important process in planning, coping,
and self-regulation, via rehearsal of likely future events or by
replaying past events (Pham & Taylor, 1999). Mental simulations
can also take the form of “painful ruminations that plague many
people suffering from depression or reacting to trauma” (Taylor et
al., 1998, p. 431), for example, an individual repetitively replaying
a memory of a car accident.
Counterfactual Thinking
Counterfactual thinking is the generation of imagined mental
representations of alternative versions of the past (Roese, 1997;
upward if better than what actually happened, e.g., “If only I had
studied more, I would have done better”; downward if worse than
reality, e.g., “If I had turned left, I would have crashed”). Repeated
counterfactual thinking is often prompted by negative affect and in
response to difficult events (Roese & Olson, 1993). Upward coun-
terfactuals can have unconstructive consequences, such as exacer-
bating shame, guilt, anxiety, sadness, and regret (Mandel, 2003;
Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; Niedenthal,
Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Sanna, 1997), and can have construc-
tive consequences, such as generating inferences about the causes
of previous difficulties, guiding effective preparative and preven-
tive behavior (Mandel & Lehman, 1996; Roese, 1997).
Defensive Pessimism
Defensive pessimism is characterized by (a) setting low expec-
tations about future outcomes and (b) a “thinking through” pro-
cess, called reflectivity/reflection, in which individuals extensively
reflect on and rehearse possible “worst-case scenarios” of what
could go wrong prior to an event and then imagine how these
negative outcomes might be prevented (Cantor & Norem, 1989;
Norem & Cantor, 1986a, 1986b; Norem & Chang, 2002; Norem &
Illingworth, 1993, 2004; Spencer & Norem, 1996). Defensive
pessimism is conceptualized as strategically serving (a) a self-
protective goal of preparing for possible failure and (b) a motiva-
tional goal of increasing effort to enhance the possibility of doing
well (Sanna, 1996, 2000; Showers, 1992; Showers & Ruben,
1990).
Reflection
Reflection has been defined as chronic self-consciousness that
involves playful exploration of novel, unique, or alternative self-
perceptions, motivated by curiosity and pleasurable, intrinsic in-
terest in philosophical thinking (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The
construct of reflection developed as an attempt to explain the
“self-absorption paradox,” which reflects the fact that private
self-consciousness is positively associated with both increased
self-knowledge, which is assumed to facilitate psychological ad-
justment, and increased psychological distress and psychopathol-
ogy. Noting that private self-consciousness was correlated with
both Neuroticism and Openness to Experience, Trapnell and
Campbell (1999) hypothesized that the self-absorption paradox
could be explained if there was a neurotically motivated, threat-
avoidant form of chronic self-focus, labeled rumination, which
contributes to psychopathology, as well as a contrasting form of
chronic self-focus, motivated by epistemic curiosity, labeled re-
flection, which would be associated with increased self-
knowledge. The Rumination–Reflection Questionnaire (Trapnell
& Campbell, 1999) distinguishes between reflection (e.g., “I love
analyzing why I do things”) and rumination, defined as RT about
the self prompted by threats, losses, or injustices to the self.
Mind Wandering
Mind wandering has been defined as “a shift of attention from
a primary task toward internal information, such as memories”
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, p. 946). Mind wandering can be
persistent and repetitive, and as such fits within RT. Mind wan-
dering has unconstructive consequences in terms of reduced atten-
tion to external task-related information and interfering with per-
formance on tasks that require substantial controlled processing
(Smallwood, Davies, et al., 2004; Teasdale, Dritschel, et al., 1995).
However, it is hypothesized to facilitate problem solving by re-
peated working over unresolved current concerns (Smallwood &
Schooler, 2006).
Post-Event Rumination
Post-event rumination (also called “post-event processing” and
“post-mortem thinking”) has been defined as “repetitive thoughts
about subjective experiences during a recent social interaction,
including self-appraisals and external evaluations of partners and
other details involving the event” (Kashdan & Roberts, 2007, p.
286). Post-event rumination is hypothesized to contribute to the
development and maintenance of social anxiety (Clark & Wells,
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).
Positive Rumination
Positive rumination has been defined as “the tendency to re-
spond to positive affective states with thoughts about positive
self-qualities, positive affective experience, and one’s favorable
life circumstances that might amplify the positive affect” (S. L.
Johnson, McKenzie, & McMurrich, in press). Positive rumination
is hypothesized to be a process that may contribute to the dysregu-
lation of positive affect in individuals vulnerable to mania and
hypomania. The Responses to Positive Affect Questionnaire (Feld-
man, Joorman, & Johnson, in press) assesses how much an indi-
vidual ruminates in response to positive mood (e.g., “When you
feel happy, excited, or enthused how often do you: ‘Think about
how happy you feel’”).
Habitual Negative Self-Thinking
Habitual negative self-thinking is negative self-thinking that has
become a mental habit, defined as having “a history of repetition,
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tally efficient, and sometimes difficult to control” (Verplanken,
Friborg, Wang, Trafimow, & Woolf, 2007, p. 526). The Habit
Index of Negative Thinking (Verplanken et al., 2007) assesses the
self-reported experience of the frequency, awareness, automaticity,
and control of negative thinking.
Overview
From this brief summary, it is clear that RT is a process common
to a number of important constructs in the realms of psychopa-
thology and self-regulation that has been hypothesized to have
both constructive and unconstructive consequences. Throughout
this article, I will use the construct RT as the generic label to
represent the constructs reviewed above, in preference to other
labels such as worry and rumination, because RT is (a) more
inclusive than other conceptualizations, encompassing the full
range of constructs reviewed above; (b) not wedded to a particular
theoretical viewpoint, unlike, say, rumination, which is typically
associated with RST; (c) less likely to cause confusion than other
terms that already have multiple conceptualizations and meanings
(e.g., rumination); (d) uncontaminated with prior assumptions as to
whether it is constructive or unconstructive, unlike rumination,
whose clinical usage typically reflects pathological processes; (e)
highly correlated with measures of worry and rumination, which in
turn are highly related to each other, suggesting the value of
examining more generic conceptualizations of thought process
(Feldman & Hayes, 2005; Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, &
Heimberg, 2002; Harrington & Blankenship, 2002; Hong, 2007;
Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005; Segerstrom,
Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000; Verplanken et al., 2007; Watkins,
2004b; Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005).
Studies Included in the Review
A computerized search using keyword terms was conducted to
identify relevant publications for this review. The search, intended
to search for studies investigating RT, included the following
terms (using wild cards, such as ruminat* for ruminate, rumina-
tion, ruminator, ruminative): repetitive thought, worry, rumina-
tion, perseverative cognition, mental simulation, cognitive pro-
cessing, emotional processing, reflection, problem solving,
defensive pessimism, mind wandering, and counterfactual entered
into a number of academic databases (e.g., Web of Science—
Science Citation Index Extended and Social Science Citation In-
dex, PsycINFO, MEDLINE) from the beginning point of each
database through the middle of 2007. The Social Science Citation
Index was also searched for references citing seminal articles (e.g.,
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000). In addition, reference lists of the
obtained articles as well as numerous review articles and chapters
(e.g., Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996) were reviewed for relevant
articles.
Studies were included in this review if they reported either
constructive or unconstructive consequences associated with RT.
Constructive consequences were defined in terms of beneficial and
positive outcomes and products, including (but not limited to)
reduced negative affect, increased positive affect, decreases in
anxiety and depression, improved physical or mental health, im-
proved performance (e.g., better academic grades and exam re-
sults), helpful cognitions and behaviors (e.g., generating plans,
active behavioral problem solving, information seeking), and im-
proved cognitive functioning (e.g., improved memory recall, better
concentration), with unconstructive consequences defined in terms
of the reverse, detrimental and negative outcomes.
Three principal types of studies were considered: (a) cross-
sectional designs in which a measure of RT was found to be
correlated with a measure of positive or negative outcome; (b)
prospective longitudinal designs that assessed extent of RT at an
initial assessment point (T1) and examined whether it predicted a
dependent variable (e.g., depression) at a later date (T2), typically
controlling for the dependent variable at T1; and (c) experimental
designs that manipulated degree and/or nature of RT, and mea-
sured potential consequences, and, thus, could determine whether
RT had a causal effect on the measured dependent variable. The
latter two designs were given greater weight in the review because
they demonstrate that the dependent variable is a consequence of
RT, through indicating either a direct causal role of RT (experi-
mental) or a predictive function for RT antecedent to the depen-
dent variable (longitudinal). Throughout, the review will be orga-
nized by type of study, and, where appropriate, by whether the
consequences are main effects of RT or are moderated by inter-
actions with other factors. It is worth noting at the outset that the
literature on the unconstructive consequences of RT has been
better developed than the literature on the constructive conse-
quences of RT.
RT With Unconstructive Consequences
The main findings that emerged from reviewing this literature
are that RT is implicated in (a) vulnerability to depression, (b)
vulnerability to anxiety, and (c) difficulties in physical health.
Table 1 summarizes the relevant articles, reporting the design,
sample, measures, and main findings. The section on RT and
depression is the largest because of the extensive research on
depressive rumination.
RT and Vulnerability to Depression
Cross-Sectional Studies
In cross-sectional studies using the RSQ, depressive rumina-
tion is found to be (a) elevated in currently depressed patients,
formerly depressed patients, and women relative to men (Riso
et al., 2003; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998) and (b) associated
with depressive symptoms in adults (Eshun, 2000; Ito et al.,
2003; Lam, Smith, Checkley, Rijsdijk, & Sham, 2003; Rich-
mond, Spring, Sommerfeld, & McChargue, 2001; see the re-
view by Thomsen, 2006), children (Abela, Vanderbilt, &
Rochon, 2004; Ziegert & Kistner, 2002), and adolescents
(Kuyken, Watkins, Holden, & Cook, 2006). Moreover, depres-
sive rumination partially accounts for the 2:1 rates of depres-
sion in women relative to men: Once statistically adjusted for,
there is no difference between men and women in rates of
depression (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Grant et al.,
2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999).
(text continues on page 175)
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Studies Demonstrating Unconstructive Consequences of Repetitive Thought (RT)
Author Design and sample Measure Main finding
Cross-sectional studies
Abbott & Rapee
(2004)
54 socially anxious patients vs.
32 non-anxious controls
Post-event RT for 1 wk after
impromptu speech
Post-event RT: Socially phobic  non-anxious
Abela et al. (2004) 260 3
rd &7
th grade children RSQ, CDI RT positively correlated depression.
Borkovec et al.
(1983)
Study 1: 305 u/g’s STAI, BDI, % of day worrying Worry correlated anxiety, depression, social-evaluative
fears
Callander & Brown
(2007)
62 women at recurrent
miscarriage clinic
Thought listing, anxiety, depression Upward counterfactuals positively correlated anxiety
Clohessy & Ehlers
(1999)
56 ambulance service workers PSS, GHQ, responses to intrusions
(RT)
RT positively correlated with post-traumatic stress
symptoms
Conway et al.
(2000)
Study 2: 188 u/g’s RSS, distress about current
concern, BDI, NEO–FFI
Rumination on sadness significantly positively
correlated with BDI & neuroticism
Edwards et al.
(2003)
High vs. low social anxious Post-event RT for 1 wk after
impromptu speech
Negative rumination: High anxious  low anxious
El Leithy et al.
(2006)
46 victims of physical assault IES–R, counterfactual fluency &
frequency
Frequency of counterfactual thinking positively
correlated with posttraumatic distress
Eshun (2000) 194 college students, USA &
Ghana
RSQ, suicidal ideation
questionnaire
Gender and rumination accounted for significant
variance in suicidal ideation
Feldman & Hayes
(2005)
Study 3; 325 u/g’s MMAP, RSQ, PSWQ, SPSI–R,
MASQ
Stagnant deliberation & outcome fantasy correlated
with increased depression & anxiety; problem
analysis correlated increased anxiety
Grant et al. (2004) 622 low-income, African
American adolescents
RSQ, depression, anxiety on YSR Depression: girlsboys. Rumination correlated
depression. Gender effect for depression mediated
by extent of rumination
Harrington &
Blakenship
(2002)
199 u/gs BDI, BAI, GRS Rumination significantly positively correlated with
depression and anxiety
Harvey (2000) 30 insomnia patients, 30 good
sleepers
Semi-structured interview Pre-sleep worry: Insomnia patients  good sleepers
Ito et al. (2003) Retrospective, 106 parents
following death of a child
rumination, SCID, RSQ Ruminative coping after loss was significantly
associated with MDE
Johnson et al. (in
press)
28 Bipolar Disorder patients,
35 MDD patients; 44 no
mood disorder
RSQ, RPA Depressive rumination: Bipolar  MDD  no mood
disorder; positive rumination: Bipolar  MDD 
no mood disorder. Positive rumination positively
correlated hypomania
Joorman et al.
(2006)
64 MDD patients RSQ, emotional facial dot-probe Brooding significantly correlated with attentional bias
towards sad faces
Kocovski et al.
(2005)
55 high vs. 57 low socially
anxious u/g’s
Vignettes of public mistakes Report of rumination: High socially anxious  low
socially anxious
Kuyken et al.
(2006)
High vs. low risk vs. MDD;
326 adolescents (age 14–18)
EPQ–N, BDI, RSQ, PHQ–A Rumination: MDD  at risk (high N)  not at risk
Rumination correlated depression in MDD group
Lam et al. (2003) 109 MDD patients RSQ, BDI, ASQ, DAS Rumination correlated depression scores, number of
past depression episodes
Lyubomirsky et al.
(2006)
Retrospective, 70 breast cancer
survivors
RSQ, delay in seeking help Time to presentation: High ruminators  low
ruminators (on average 39 days longer)
Markman & Miller
(2006)
58 u/gs divided into severe
depression, mild-to-moderate
depression, no depression,
generated counterfactuals
about recent negative
academic event
Coding of counterfactuals, rating of
negative event
Greater reduction in negative ratings following RT for
less depressed. Uncontrollable, characterological
counterfactuals: severe depression  no depression
 mild-to-moderate depression
Mellings & Alden
(2000)
58 socially anxious; 58 non-
anxious
Frequency of post-event RT
following social interaction
Frequency of post-event RT: Socially anxious  non-
anxious. RT predicted recall of negative self-related
information, negative self-judgments when
anticipating a further social interaction
Meyer et al. (1990) Study 2: 405 u/g’s PSWQ, BDI, STAI Worry positively correlated anxiety and depression
Nolen-Hoeksema &
Jackson (2001)
740 community sample RSQ, beliefs recontrollability of
emotions, mastery of negative
events
Beliefs about controllability of emotions, mastery of
negative events mediated gender difference in
rumination
Papadakis et al.
(2006)
223 girls between 7
th–12
th
grade
RSQ, discrepancy between actual
& ideal self, BDI
Rumination interacted with discrepancy to predict
concurrent depression
Perini et al. (2006) High vs. low socially anxious
groups
Post-event RT for 1 wk after
speech
Post-event rumination: Socially anxious  low
anxious
(table continues)
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Author Design and sample Measure Main finding
Cross-sectional studies
Rachman et al.
(2000)
130 u/g’s BDI, social anxiety inventory, post
event RT
Post-event RT significantly positively correlated with
social anxiety and depression
Richmond et al.
(2001)
145 u/g’s IDD, RSQ Increased rumination associated greater levels of
current and past depressive symptoms
Riso et al. (2003) Outpatients: 42 dysthymia; 27
nonchronic MDD; 24
control participant
SCID, DAS, ASQ, RSQ, IDS Ruminative response style: Dysthymia  nonchronic
MDD  never-ill controls
Roberts et al.
(1998)
Study 1: 13 CD; 13 PD; 19
ND; Study 2: 24 CD; 87
PPD; 149 BPD; 356 ND
RSQ, BDI, IDD, IDD–L Study 1: Rumination: currently dysphoric (CD) 
previously dysphoric (PD)  never-dysphoric (ND)
Study 2: Rumination: CD  prolonged PD  brief
PD  ND. Rumination: females  males.
Rumination mediates effects of gender & N on
dysphoria.
Rude et al. (2007) Study 1: 232 u/g’s. Study 2:
463 u/g’s
Study 1: RSQ, STAI, Self-rating
depression scale; Study 2: non-
judging RSQ, RSQ, BDI
Study1&2 :both brooding & reflection positively
associated depression, anxiety. Study 2: non-judging
reflection not correlated with depression.
Schlotz et al.
(2004)
219 pts Worry & work overload, saliva on
awaking & at 30, 45, 60 mins
for 6 days
Increased worry associated greater increase and
elevated mean levels of cortisol on weekdays
Schwartz et al.
(2000)
Recovery after anger recall; 30
general population
Thoughts related to anger recall,
BP
Slower BP recovery after anger recall in women only
Segerstrom et al.
(2000)
Study 1: 110 u/g’s; 40 CBT
outpatients
Measure of RT, RSQ, PSWQ, BDI,
BAI
Study 1: RT correlated RSQ, PSWQ; anxiety &
depression
Smallwood,
O’Connor, et al.
(2004)
Study 1: 30 u/g’s. Examined
mind wandering via thought
probes during vigilance and
word encoding tasks
CES–D Mind wandering (task unrelated thought during
probes) positively correlated with depression
Smallwood et al.
(2007)
37 u/g’s split into high vs. low
dysphoric, thought probes
during word encoding vs.
word shadowing followed
by word fragment
completion recognition task
CES–D, RSQ During word encoding, high dysphoric group showed
an increase in mind wandering relative to low
dysphoric group. Mind wandering associated slower
reaction times, poorer recognition in the encoding
condition.
Steil & Ehlers
(2000)
2 Studies: 159 & 138 RTA
survivors
PSS, cognitive strategies incl.
rumination
Rumination positively correlated with PTSD severity
Suchday et al.
(2004)
40 male students Recovery of BP after provocation,
angry rumination
Angry rumination associated slower recovery of BP
Thomsen et al.
(2003)
126 students ECQ–R, POMS, PSQI RT positively correlated with depressive, anxious &
angry mood, poorer sleep quality, longer sleep-
onset.
Trapnell &
Campbell (1999)
3 samples u/g’s, n  441, n 
570, n  710
RRQ, NEO-FFI, BDI Rumination scale significantly positively correlated
with depressive symptoms (r  .38, r  .36) and
neuroticism (r  .64)
Verplanken et al.
(2007)
Study 2: 142 u/g’s; study 3: 97
u/g’s
HINT, ATQ, RSE Habitual negative self-thinking positively correlated
negative thoughts, low self-esteem (Study 2, 3)
Ziegert & Kistner
(2002)
201 adolescents RSQ, CDI Rumination elevated in girls relative to boys;
rumination associated with depressive symptoms
Longitudinal studies
Abela et al. (2002) T2  6 wks; 130 3
rd & 184
7
th grade children
RSQ, CDI RT at T1 predicted depressive symptoms at T2
Andrea et al.
(2004)
T2  10 mths; 253 low vs.
204 high fatigue pts
PSWQ, self-reported fatigue Worry & fatigue strongly positively correlated at T1.
Worry at T1 predicted fatigue at T2, but only for
low fatigue participants after controlling T1 fatigue
Broadbent et al.
(2003)
T2  1
st 20 hrs after hernia
surgery; 36 hernia patients
Pre-surgery worry, wound fluid Greater worry predicted lower levels of matrix
metalloproteinase-9 in wound fluid & self-reports of
painful, poorer, and slower recovery
Burwell & Shirk
(2007)
T1  spring of 8
th grade, T2
 fall of 9
th grade, T3 
spring of 9
th grade (1 yr
later); 127 adolescents
(mean  14 yrs)
CDI, RSQ, CDRS-R Brooding predicted change in depression scores after
controlling for T1 depression, but reflection did not
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Butler & Nolen-
Hoeksema
(1994)
T2  2 wks; 125 male, 74
female u/g’s
RSQ, BDI Rumination: female  male. Rumination predicted T2
BDI, controlling T1 BDI. Once rumination
included, gender not predict depression.
Calmes & Roberts
(2007)
T2  6–8 wks; 451 u/g’s BAI, BDI, PSWQ, RSQ RT (worry & rumination) predicted T2 anxiety but not
T2 depression, controlling for T1 symptoms.
Symptom-focused rumination predicted T2
depression.
Ciesla & Roberts
(2007)
Study 4: T2  6 wks; 169
u/g’s
RSQ, BDI, RSE, LES Study 4: RT at T1 predicted depressive symptoms at
T2 only in pts with low self-esteem & high life
stress
Ehlers et al. (1998) T1  3 mths after RTA, T2 
1 yr after; 967 consecutive
RTA patients
PSS, RT about RTA RT at T1 predicted PTSD symptoms at T2 after
controlling severity
Ehlers et al. (2003) T2  6 mths; 81 children age
5–16 after RTA
PTSD symptoms, RT rating Cognitive variables including RT at T1 predicted
PTSD symptoms at T2
Evers et al. (1998) T2  1 year; 91 arthritis
patients
Self-reported functional status, grip
strength, worry
Worry on PCI at T1 predicted functional status & grip
strength at T2, controlling for T1 scores
Feldman & Hayes
(2005)
Study 4. T1 start 1
st semester;
T2 end 1
st semester (13
wks); 110 1
st year law
students
MMAP, RSQ, PSWQ, SPSI–R,
MASQ
Study 4: Stagnant deliberation & outcome fantasy at
T1 predicted depression at T2, controlling for T1
depression
Fortune et al.
(2003)
Duration of
photochemotherapy; 112
chronic psoriasis patients
PSWQ, HADS, psoriasis area &
severity index
Worry predicted time to clearance: psoriasis cleared
1.8  slower in high worriers vs. low worriers
Holeva et al.
(2001)
T2  6 mths; 265 RTA
patients
TCQ, PTS Use of worry to control thoughts at T1 predicted
PTSD at T2
Hong (2007) T2  1 mth; 241 u/g’s PSWQ, RSQ, MASQ, COPE T1 worry predicted T2 anxiety & depression;
controlling T1 symptoms. T1 rumination predicted
T2 depression, controlling T1 symptoms
Ito et al. (2005,
2006)
T2  8 mths; 191 u/g’s RSQ, DAS, depression Negative rumination was significant predictor of
depression
Just & Alloy
(1997)
Follow-ups every 6 weeks for
18 mths; 189 non-depressed
u/g’s at high & low risk for
MDE
RSQ, BDI, SADS–L, DAS, CSQ Rumination predicted onset of MDE & severity of
episode
Kubzansky et al.
(1997)
T2  20 years; 1759 men free
CHD
Trait worry Worry about social conditions predicts the onset of
CHD
Kuehner & Weber
(1999)
T2  4 wks, T3  4 mths
after discharge; 49 unipolar
MDD inpatients
PSE–10, IDD, RSQ Rumination at T2 predicted (a) levels of depressive
symptoms at T3; (b) MDE at T3 in those not
remitted at T2
Mayou et al.
(2001)
T1 after RTA, T2  3 mths,
T3  1 yr; 773 consecutive
RTA patients
HADS, PSS, cognitive variables
incl. rumination
Rumination at T2 predicted depression, general
anxiety and PTSD symptoms at T3, after
adjustment other predictors (severity, previous
mood)
Mayou et al.
(2002)
T2  3 yrs; 546 RTA patients PSS, emotional response;
rumination
Rumination at 3 mths&1y rpredicted PTSD severity
at 3 yrs, though not after controlling for PTSD at 3
mths
Michael et al.
(2005)
T1 12 wks post-assault, T2 6
mths; 73 assault survivors
PDS, BDI, intrusions incl.
rumination
Rumination about intrusive thoughts at T1 predicted
PTSD symptoms at T2
Moberly &
Watkins (in
press)
Between subsequent intervals
(1.5 hrs) in ESM design; 93
adults
ruminative self-focus, negative
affect 8  daily at random
intervals, RSQ
RSQ predicted momentary ruminative self-focus.
Ruminative self-focus predicted negative affect at
T2, controlling for negative affect at T1
Morrison &
O’Connor (2005)
T2  6 mths; 161 u/g’s RSQ, life events Rumination at T1 interacted with reported stress to
predict social dysfunction at T2
Murray et al.
(2002)
T2  4 wks, T3  6 mths; 27
inpatient, 176 outpatient
RTA patients
PDS, cognitive factors incl.
rumination
Rumination at T1 predicted PTSD symptoms at T2
and T3
Rumination at T2 predicted PTSD symptoms at T3,
even controlling for dissociation and injury severity
Nolan et al. (1998) T2  8–10 wks; 135 u/g’s EPQ–N, IDD, RSQ N & rumination predicted T2 depression controlling
T1 depression, with this effect moderated T1
depression
Nolen-Hoeksema
(2000)
T2  1 year; 1,109 community
sample
RSQ, HRSD, BDI, SCID, BAI Rumination predicted: (a) onset of MDE in never-
depressed; (b) levels of anxiety and depression at
T2, controlling T1 symptoms
(table continues)
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Nolen-Hoeksema et
al. (1997)
T2  1 year; 30 gay men,
whose partners died from
AIDS
Rumination from interview
transcripts, IES, CES–D
Rumination predicted increased distress (intrusive &
avoidant thoughts) but not depression, although not
after controlling T1 IES
Nolen-Hoeksema et
al. (1999)
T2  1 year later; 1,132
community adults
BDI, HRSD, RSQ, chronic strain,
mastery
Rumination, chronic strain, & mastery mediated
gender difference in depression
Nolen-Hoeksema &
Morrow (1991)
T2  10 days after quake (n
 137), T3  7 wks after
quake (n  41); 250 u/g’s 2
wks before 1989 Lomo
Prieta earthquake
RSQ, IDD Rumination at T1 predicted depression and PTSD
stress symptoms at T2 and T3, controlling for T1
symptoms. Rumination about earthquake at T2
predicted stress symptoms at T3
Nolen-Hoeksema et
al. (1993)
79 u/g’s 30 day diary of mood &
rumination
More ruminative responses predicted increased
duration of depressed mood, after controlling for
initial severity of mood
Nolen-Hoeksema et
al. (1994)
T2  6 mths; 253 adults, 1
mth after death of loved one
RSQ, HRSD, BDI, Social support Rumination at T1 predicted level of depressive
symptoms at T2 controlling T1 depression
Nolen-Hoeksema et
al. (2007)
Annually for 4 yrs; 496 female
adolescents, 11–15 yrs old
RSQ, SADS for Children, Eating
Disorder Examination, substance
abuse
Rumination predicted increases in depression, bulimia
symptoms & substance abuse over following yr;
controlling for 1 year lag of symptoms. Depression
and bulimic symptoms predicted increases in
rumination over yr
Raes, Hermans,
Williams,
Beyers, et al.
(2006)
T2  7 mths; 28 MDD
patients
RSS, BDI, HRSD, AMT Rumination on sadness at T1 predicted BDI at T2 &
mediated relationship between memory specificity
& BDI
Rector & Roger
(1996)
T1 start of term, T2  8 wks
later, 121 1
st year u/g’s
ECQ–R, GHC, York self-esteem
inventory
Anxiety, depression, insomnia on GHC at T2
predicted by rehearsal at T1
Robinson & Alloy
(2003)
T2  2.5 yrs; 148 u/g’s at
high and low cognitive risk
Stress-reactive rumination, RSQ,
BDI, DAS, CSQ, SADS–L
Stress-reactive rumination at T1 predicted future MDE
at T2 in individuals with high DAS, CSQ but not
low DAS, CSQ
Roelofs et al.
(2006)
T2  6 mths; 331 at T1, 73 at
T2 u/g’s
RSQ, RRQ, Zung depression scale,
STAI
Joint factor “rumination on causes of sadness”
interacted with T1 depression to predict T2
depression, after controlling T1 rumination &
depression
Roger & Najarian
(1998)
T1  immediately after exam,
T2  3 wks later; 51
student nurses
ECO–R, urinary cortisol Increases in cortisol T1 to T2 associated with
increased RT
Rohan et al. (2003) T1  Oct–Nov, T2  Jan–
Feb; 20 SAD women; 20
controls
RSQ, BDI, SCID, HRSD In SAD, RT assessed at T1 predicted depressive
symptoms during winter at T2, after controlling for
T1 depression
Sakamoto et al.
(2001)
T2  2 mths; 98 u/g’s RSQ, Self-Rating Depression Scale Rumination at T1 predicts ruminative responses and
cognitive symptoms of depression at T2
Sarin et al. (2005) T1  grading of difficult
midterm exam; T2  4–8
hrs later, T3  4 days later;
87 u/g’s
RSQ, MASQ Rumination at T1 predicts increases in anxiety at T2
and increases in both depression & anxiety at T3
Schmaling et al.
(2002)
Course of treatment; 96
dysthymia / minor
depression
RSQ, BDI, HRSD Rumination predicts more depression/poor treatment
response across all 3 treatment conditions: PST,
paroxetine or placebo
Schwartz & Koenig
(1996)
T2  6 wks; 397 adolescents RSQ, ASQ, CDI Rumination at T1 predicted depression at T2
Segerstrom et al.
(1998)
2, 8, 15 weeks after Northridge
earthquake 1994; 47 hospital
workers
PSWQ, IES, POMS, NK cells NK cells: Low worriers  high worriers
Intrusive thoughts: High worriers  low worriers
Segerstrom et al.
(2000)
Study 2: T1  prior midterm
exam; T2  1w k
post-exam; 90 u/g’s
Measure of RT, RSQ, PSWQ, BDI,
BAI
Shared variance between RSQ & PSWQ (repetitive
thought) predicted maintenance of anxiety, after
controlling for T1 anxiety (p  .07)
Siegle et al. (1999) Treatment outcome; 53 MDD
or dysthymia patients
RSQ, weekly BDI during CBT Rumination was associated with slower recovery from
depression, in part mediated by initial depression
Smith et al. (2006) T2  2.5 yrs; 137 u/g’s with
high vs. low cognitive risk
RSQ, BDI, DAS, CSQ,
hopelessness, suicidal ideation
Presence & duration of suicidal ideation at T2
predicted by rumination at T1, with this effect
partially mediated by hopelessness
Spasojevic & Alloy
(2001)
Assessed every 6 weeks for
2.5 years; 137 u/g’s with
high vs. low cognitive risk
RSQ, BDI, DAS, CSQ, SADS–L Rumination mediated effects of dysfunctional
attitudes, past depression, self-criticism on onset of
MDE
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Stanton, Danoff-
Burg, et al.
(2000)
T1  20 wks after treatment,
T2  3 mths later; 92
female breast cancer patients
COPE, emotional processing &
expression, POMS
Emotional processing at T1 predicted higher distress
scores at T2, after controlling T1 distress and
emotional expression
Thomson, Mehlsen,
Hokland, et al.
(2004)
T2  1 year; 96 20–35 yr
olds, 110 70–85 yr olds
ECQ–R, self-reported physical
problems
RT significantly predicted self-reported physical health
only for 20–35 yr olds
Thomsen, Mehlsen,
Olesen, et al.
(2004)
Immunological measures 7–14
days after T1, follow-up 1
yr; 196 20–35 yr olds; 314
70–85 yr olds
ECO–R, POMS, MMSE, sleep
quality. Health care use
RT associated sad mood & poor sleep quality
In 70–85 yr olds, RT predicted numbers of leukocytes
and lymphocytes, and increased health care
utilization, esp. telephone consultation
Treynor et al.
(2003)
T2  1 yr; 1130 community
sample
RSQ, BDI Brooding subscale at T1 predicted more depression at
T2 controlling for depression at T1
Verplanken et al.
(2007)
T2  9 mths; 1,102
Norwegian citizens
HINT, HADS, DAS, life events Controlling for T1 symptoms, dysfunctional attitudes
& life events, habitual negative self-thinking
predicted anxiety & depression at T2
Young & Azam
(2003)
Sept to Nov (T1); Jan to
March (T2); 18 SAD
patients
14 day diary of mood &
rumination, BDI
Diary measure of rumination in the fall (T1) predicted
winter depression at T2, after controlling for T1
BDI
Experimental studies
Andrews &
Borkovec (1988)
Velten inductions: worry vs.
depression vs. somatic
anxiety vs. neutral;
128 u/g’s
MAACL For MAACL depression: Depression  Worry 
Somatic anxiety  neutral. For MAACL anxiety:
Somatic anxiety  worry  depression  neutral
Behar et al. (2005) 5-min counterbalanced worry
vs. trauma recall vs.
relaxation; u/g’s Study 1:
78; Study 2: 43 / GAD,
PTSD symptoms
depression & anxiety ratings Study 1, 2: Worry  verbal thought, trauma recall 
imagery. For anxiety: worry  trauma recall 
relaxation. For depression: trauma recall  worry
 relaxation.
Blagden & Craske
(1996)
Anxious mood induction then
RUM vs. DIS, activity vs.
passivity; 44 u/g’s
POMS Anxious mood: Rumination  Distraction
Borkovec et al.
(1993)
30s relaxation vs. general-
worry vs. thought-worry vs.
image-worry vs. affect-
worry, then public speaking
image  10; 75 female high
speech anxious u/g’s
HR, fear rating HR during threat image: Relaxation  Thought-worry:
other 3 conditions between but ns difference. Fear
rating during public speaking image: All Worry
conditions  Relaxation
Borkovec & Hu
(1990)
Day 1: Neutral vs. relaxation
vs. worry, day 2: imagine
public speaking  10 trials;
45 female high speech
anxious u/g’s
HR, fear rating HR increase to imagery: Relaxation  neutral 
worry. Fear report to images: Worry  neutral
Borkovec et al.
(1983)
Study 3: 0 vs. 15-min vs. 30-
min worry periods, with pre-
& post-manipulation focus-
breathing tasks; 60 u/g
worriers vs. nonworriers
MAACL, HR Anxiety, depression, hostility: Worriers  nonworriers
Negative distracting thoughts: Increase in 15-min
worry, decrease in 0-min, 30-min worry
Brosschot & van
der Doef (2006)
Postpone worry to 30-min
period daily vs. no
intervention; 171 high
school students
6 day log of worry, somatic
symptoms for 3 days pre-/post-
intervention
Postponers fewer somatic complaints than control
group, controlling for baseline complaints, with
worry duration acting as mediator
Bushman (2002) Anger induction (insult from
other pt), then hitting
punchbag thinking about
other (rumination) vs.
thinking about getting fit
(distraction) vs. control; 602
u/g’s
MAACL-anger, PANAS,
Aggression measure: noise
directed to other
Anger: rumination  distraction  control
Aggression: rumination  control
(table continues)
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Bushman et al.
(2005)
Study 1 Provocation, then
RUM vs. DIS vs. positive
mood, then trigger vs. no
trigger for irritation (poor
vs. good performance of
research assistant); 42 u/g’s
Study 2: Provocation vs. no
provocation, RUM vs. DIS,
trigger vs. no trigger
(positive vs. negative
evaluations from other pt);
385 u/g’s. Study 3:
provocation then RUM vs.
no-rumination, then 8 hr
later trigger vs. no trigger;
93 u/g’s
anger ratings, aggression measure
(evaluation research assistant/hot
sauce allocated to confederate/
noise directed at other)
Anger: rumination  distraction in all 3 studies
Study 1: After trigger, aggression in RUM  DIS 
positive mood; no difference after no trigger
condition
Study 2: Provocation  Rumination  Trigger
interaction: for provoked participants, in the
presence of trigger, more hot sauce allocated in
RUM than DIS, with this effect mediated by
negative affect in response to trigger.
Study 3: After trigger, aggression in RUM  no rum,
no difference if no trigger
Ciesla & Roberts
(2007)
Study 1: negative mood
induction, followed by no-
task delay period; 126 u/g’s;
Study 2: negative mood
induction, then RUM vs.
DIS; 132 u/g’s
BDI, MAACL, RSQ, RSS, RSE,
DAS, ASQ
Study 1: RT predicted post-delay dysphoria,
controlling for post-induction dysphoria but only in
low self-esteem/high DAS pts. Study 2: lower self-
esteem/higher DAS associated higher levels of
dysphoria, this effect stronger in RUM vs. DIS.
Conway et al.
(2000)
Study 3: mood induction, then
no delay vs. 5-min delay; 37
high vs. 24 low RSS scorers
RSS, distress about current
concern, BDI
High RSS scorers more distressed in delay condition
than no-delay condition
Donaldson & Lam
(2004)
RUM vs. DIS; 36 MDD, 36
controls
mood, MEPS In MDD (not controls), more negative mood and
poorer problem solutions in RUM  DIS
Glynn et al. (2002) Study 1: emotional vs.
nonemotional stressor, high
vs. low reactivity task,
followed by rumination (
recall stressor vividly); 72
u/g’s. Study 2: mental
arithmetic task, then 10 mins
delay (potential rumination)
vs. DIS; 20 u/g’s
Study 1: BP, HR. Study 2. BP, HR Study 1: Elevated BP during rumination and slower
BP recovery following the emotional stressor
conditions (mental arithmetic, shock avoidance) but
not following non-emotional stressors (physical
exercise, cold-pressor)
Study 2: Speed of BP recovery: Distraction  RT
Guastella &
Moulds (2007)
Evening after mid-session
exam RUM vs. DIS; 59 high
vs. 55 low trait ruminators
RSQ, IES, Sleep-Disturbance Pre-sleep intrusive thoughts: High-trait ruminators 
low-trait ruminators, RUM  DIS; Sleep quality:
high-trait ruminators in RUM condition  other 3
groups
Hazlett-Stevens &
Borkovec (2001)
Relaxation vs. control vs.
worry prior to speech; 42
speech-anxious u/g’s
Anxiety, HR, MSD of IBI Anxiety before and during first speech: worry 
control  relaxation. HR, MSD of IBI no
difference across conditions
Hertel (1998) RUM vs. DIS vs. waiting
condition; 36 Dys vs. 54
Non-dys u/g’s
BDI, stem-completion memory test Controlled retrieval of target words: In Dys, DIS 
waiting  RUM; no difference in Non-dys
Joorman & Siemer
(2004)
(Study 1): Positive vs. negative
mood induction, then RUM
vs. DIS; 119 u/g’s, Dys vs.
Non-Dys on CES-D
mood ratings, time to recall
memories to / cues
After negative induction, Non-Dys (not Dys) who
ruminated recalled mood-incongruent (positive)
memories faster. After positive induction, Dys who
ruminated recalled mood-congruent (positive)
memories slower than Non-Dys
Kao et al. (2006) RUM vs. DIS; 33 Dys u/g’s
(BDI  14); 33 Non-dys
u/g’s (BDI  6)
mood, MEPS, memory recall
during MEPS
Post-manipulation dysphoria: Dys ruminators  other
3 groups. Effectiveness of problem solving: Dys
ruminators  other 3 groups. Categoric memories:
Dys ruminators  Dys distractors  other 2 groups
Kashdan & Roberts
(2007)
Personal self-disclosure vs.
small talk; 83 u/g’s
Social anxiety, post-event
rumination; BDI, PANAS
At higher levels of social anxiety, post-event
rumination associated with increases in negative
affect following personal disclosure, but decreases
in negative affect following small talk
Lavender &
Watkins (2004)
RUM vs. DIS; 30 MDD vs. 30
control participants
Future thinking task, SCID Within MDD patients, no. of negative future events
generated, RUM  DIS; no effect in controls
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Lyonfields et al.
(1995)
Within-subject, baseline vs.
worry imagery vs. verbal
worry; 15 GAD vs. 15
controls
HR, MSD of IBI, anxiety ratings Vagal (parasympathetic) tone (MSD of IBI): GAD 
controls. Little change in vagal tone across tasks in
GAD group, but decline in vagal tone across tasks
in controls
Anxiety: verbal worry  worry imagery
Lyubomirsky et al.
(2003)
Study 1: RUM vs. DIS vs.
planning, 45 Dys (BDI 
15) vs. 46 Non-Dys (BDI 
3)
Study 1: CIQ, reading task, Study 1: dysphoric mood, time spend reading passage,
interfering thoughts in Dys-ruminative group 
other 4 groups. Study 2: dysphoric mood, time
answering questions in Dys-ruminative group 
other 3 groups
Study 2: RUM vs. DIS, 28
Dys vs. 26 Non-Dys. Study
3: RUM vs. DIS, 33 Dys vs.
32 Non-Dys
Study 2: questions on videotaped
lecture. Study 3, COQ during
puzzle, proof-reading
Study 3: dysphoric mood, interfering thoughts, poorer
proof-reading in Dys-ruminative group  other 3
groups
Lyubomirsky &
Nolen-Hoeksema
(1995)
RUM vs. DIS, Dys (BDI–SF
 7) vs. Non-Dys (BDI–SF
 3); Dys vs. Non-Dys u/
g’s - Study 1: 33 vs. 36;
Study 2: 36 vs. 37; Study 3:
36 vs. 33
Mood ratings. Study 1: CBQ.
Study 2: future predictions.
Study 3: MEPS
All studies - dysphoric mood: Dys-ruminative group
 other 3 groups. Study 1: depressed-distorted
thoughts, pessimistic attributions: Dys-ruminative
group  other 3 groups. Study 2: likelihood of
positive future events: Dys-ruminative group 
other 3 conditions. Study 3: problem-solving
effectiveness: Dys-ruminative group  other 3
groups
Lyubomirsky et al.
(1998)
RUM vs. DIS, Dys vs. Non-
Dys then (Study 1) free
recall memory task; (Study
2) cued memory task;
(Study 3) frequency ratings
for events; (Study 4) think
aloud during manipulation.
Dys vs. Non-Dys u/g’s -
Study 1: 38 vs. 34; Study 2:
25 vs. 24; Study 3: 39 vs.
33; Study 4: 20 vs. 20
Mood ratings
Memory measures
Study 1, 2, 4: dysphoria, negativity of
autobiographical memories in Dys-ruminative group
 other 3 groups
Study 3: dysphoria, reported frequency of negative
events in Dys-ruminative group  other 3 groups
McLaughlin et al.
(2007)
Within-subject, worry vs.
rumination counterbalanced
Study 1: 60 u/g’s. Study 2: 34
worrier / ruminator, 40
ruminator, 35 control
BDI, PSWQ, MASQ, PANAS,
anxiety & depression ratings
In Study1&2 ,both worry & rumination increased
negative affect, anxiety, depression & reduced
positive affect. Both involve a predominance of
thought (versus imagery)
Moberly &
Watkins (2006)
Repeated focus on emotional
scenarios, abstract vs.
concrete, prior to failure; 61
u/g’s
PANAS, ACS–P, BDI After failure, higher levels of trait RT were associated
with lower levels of positive affect, but only in
abstract condition, not in concrete condition
Morrow & Nolen-
Hoeksema
(1990)
Sad mood induction then RUM
vs. DIS, active vs. passive
task; 35 male, 34 female
u/g’s
sadness, hostility & anxiety ratings Reduction in sadness post-induction to post-task:
Distracting–active  distracting-passive 
ruminative-active  ruminative–passive
Nelson & Harvey
(2002)
Speech threat prior to bed,
think about speech verbally
(worry) vs. imagery; 31
insomnia pts
Distress, sleep-onset latency Initial distress: Imagery  Verbal worry Sleep-onset
latency: Imagery  verbal worry. Depressed mood
increased for Dys participants who ruminated, but
decreased in other 3 groups
Nolen-Hoeksema &
Morrow (1993)
RUM vs. DIS; 24 Dys vs. 24
Non-Dys u/g’s
Mood ratings Depressed mood increased for Dys participants who
ruminated, but decreased in other 3 groups
Park et al. (2004) RUM vs. DIS: Adolescents: 75
1
st episode MDD; 26 non-
depressed psychiatric pts; 33
controls
Despondency, AMT In MDD group, negative mood and categoric
autobiographical memories: RUM  DIS
Peasley-Miklus &
Vrana (2000)
Worry vs. relaxation then
feared imagery for 24 trials;
51 Fearful female u/g’s
HR, facial EMG During 1
st phase for HR: worry  relaxation. During
imagery phase for HR: relaxation  worry
Rusting & Nolen-
Hoeksema
(1998)
Study 1: angry mood
induction, then RUM vs.
DIS; 41 u/g’s. Study 3:
anger induction then RUM
vs. DIS vs. thought-listing;
60 u/g’s
anger, depression, anxiety ratings Study 1: RUM increased anger, DIS no change in
anger
Study 3 for anger: rumination  control (thought-
listing)  distraction
(table continues)
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Author Design and sample Measure Main finding
Experimental studies
Segerstrom et al.
(1999)
Exposure to phobic stimulus
vs. no exposure;
Snake/spider fearful: 7
worriers, 8 non-worriers: 6
controls
PSWQ, SCL, HR, immune function Increased SCL, HR both worry groups; increase in
NK cells in response to fear only in normal worry
group
Thayer et al.
(1996)
Baseline vs. relaxation vs.
worry; 34 GAD patients, 32
controls
HR, IBIs, MSD of IBIs Cardiac IBIs: GAD  controls. Worry  baseline
relaxation. Worry associated lower cardiac vagal
control
Thomsen,
Jorgensen, et al.
(2004)
Mood induction; 56 u/g’s ECQ–R, mood ratings Trait RT positively correlated with post-induction
stress, anxiety, anger & helplessness, controlling
pre-induction mood
Watkins (2004a) Failure then 3  expressive
writing, abstract (why?) vs.
concrete (how?); 69
community sample
ACS–P, BDI, MAACL, IES Higher levels of trait RT associated with higher levels
of negative mood 12 hr after failure in the abstract
but not the concrete writing condition
Watkins & Brown
(2002)
Within subject, RUM vs. DIS
counterbalanced; 14 MDD,
14 controls
Random number generation task For count score (index of less randomness), MDD
ruminators  other 3 conditions, i.e., DIS improved
randomness in MDD
Watkins &
Teasdale (2001)
Analytical RUM vs.
experiential RUM vs. DIS
vs. abstraction; 36 MDD
patients
despondency, AMT pre-, post-
manipulation
Post manipulation despondency: Analytical,
Experiential RUM (high self-focus)  DIS,
abstraction (low self-focus). Increase in specificity
of autobiographical memory: Experiential RUM,
DIS (low analytical)  analytical RUM, abstraction
(high analytical)
Watkins &
Teasdale (2004)
Analytical RUM vs.
experiential RUM; 28 MDD
patients
despondency, AMT Increase in specificity of autobiographical memory
pre-to-post manipulation: Experiential RUM 
Analytical RUM
Watkins et al.
(2000)
RUM vs. DIS; 48 Dys sample despondency, AMT Post-manipulation despondency: RUM  DIS
Increases in specificity of autobiographical memory
pre to post-manipulation: DIS  RUM
Wells &
Papageorgiou
(1995)
Watch upsetting film, then
control vs. imagery vs.
distraction vs. worry about
film vs. worry usual
concerns; 70 u/g’s
PSWQ, STAI, anxiety VAS,
intrusive image diary next 3 days
Number of intrusive images: worry about film 
control, all other groups not significantly different
York et al. (1987) Velten inductions worry vs.
somatic anxiety vs. neutral,
then breathing-focus task; 36
u/g’s
Negative intrusions, MAACL, HR Increases in negative intrusions during
breathing-focus: Worry  Neutral, Somatic anxiety
ns different from both. Increase in HR: Worry 
Somatic Anxiety  Neutral
Note. ACS–P  Action Control Scale—Preoccupation; AMT  Autobiographical Memory Test; ASQ  Attributional Style Questionnaire; ATQ 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire; BAI  Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI  Beck Depression Inventory; BP  blood pressure; BPD  brief previous
dysphoric group; CBQ  Cognitive Biases Questionnaire; CBT  cognitive-behavioral therapy; CD  currently dysphoric group; CDI  Childrens
Depression Inventory; CDRS–R  Children’s Depression Rating Scale—Revised; CES–D  Centre for Epidemiological Survey—Depression; CHD 
coronary heart disease; CIQ  Cognitive Interference Questionnaire; COPE  the COPE scale; CSQ  Cognitive Styles Questionnaire; DAS 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; DIS  distraction manipulation; Dys  dysphoric participants; ECO–R  Emotional Control Questionnaire—Rehearsal;
EPQ–N  Eysenck Personality Questionnaire—Neuroticism scale; ESM  Experience Sampling Methodology; GAD  generalized anxiety disorder;
GHC  general health checklist; GHQ  General Health questionnaire; GRS  Global Rumination Scale; HADS  Hospital Anxiety and Depression
Scale; HINT  Habit Index of Negative Thinking; HR  heart rate; HRSD  Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression; IDD  Inventory to Diagnose
Depression; IDD–L  Inventory to Diagnose Depression—Lifetime; IDS  Inventory of Depressive Symptoms; IES  Impact of Event Scale; IES–R 
Impact of Event Scale—Revised; LES  Life Experiences Survey; MAACL  Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist; MASQ  Mood and Anxiety
Symptom Questionnaire; MDE  major depressive episode; MDD  patients with major depressive disorder; MEPS  Means Ends Problem Solving task;
MMAP  Measure of Mental Anticipatory Processes; MMSE  Mini-Mental State Examination; MSD of IBI  Mean Successive Differences of Heart
Interbeat Intervals; N  Neuroticism; ND  never-dysphoric group; NEO–FFI  NEO-five factor inventory of personality; NK  natural killer cells;
Non-Dys  non-dysphoric participants; PANAS  Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; PCI  Pain Control Inventory; PD  previously dysphoric;
PDS  Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale; PHQ–A  Patient Health Questionnaire—Adolescent; POMS  Profile of Mood States scale; PPD  prolonged
previously dysphoric group; PSE–10  Present State Examination—10; PSS  post-traumatic stress symptom scale; PST  problem-solving therapy;
PSQI  Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index; PSWQ  Penn State Worry Questionnaire; pts  participants; PTS  posttraumatic symptoms; PTSD 
posttraumatic stress disorder; RPA  Responses to Positive Affect; RRQ  Rumination & Reflection Questionnaire; RSE  Rosenberg Self-Esteem
questionnaire; RSQ  Response Styles Questionnaire; RSS  Rumination on Sadness Scale; RTAs  road traffic accidents; RUM  rumination
manipulation; SAD  seasonal affective disorder; SADS–L  Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia—Lifetime; SCID  Structured Clinical
Interview for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; SCL  skin conductance; SPSI–R  Social Problem Solving Inventory—revised;
STAI  State Trait Anxiety Inventory; TCQ  Thought Control Questionnaire; T1  initial baseline assessment, T2  follow-up assessment, u/g’s 
undergraduates; VAS  visual analogue scale; YSR  Youth Self Report.
174 WATKINSMeasures of forms of RT other than depressive rumination are also
positively and significantly correlated with depression, including a
general tendency toward RT (e.g., global rumination scale, Harrington
& Blankenship, 2002; W. D. McIntosh & Martin, 1992; Segerstrom
et al., 2000, Study 1), worry (PSWQ, Meyer et al., 1990; Segerstrom
et al., 2000; or self-rating, Borkovec et al., 1983), rumination on
sadness (Conway et al., 2000), rumination as operationalized by
Trapnell and Campbell (1999), content-independent perseverative
thinking (Ehring, 2007), or RT measured on the Measure of Mental
Anticipatory Processes (MMAP; Feldman & Hayes, 2005). The
MMAP assesses trait disposition to respond with various forms of RT
when faced with an “important, difficult and stressful problem” (p.
492), including Stagnant Deliberation (e.g., “Whenever I think about
the problem, I often wind up getting stuck”), Problem Analysis (e.g.,
“I think about why this problem is happening”), Plan Rehearsal (e.g.,
“I mentally visualize the steps involved in solving the problem”), and
Outcome Fantasy (e.g., “I fantasize about it all just going away”)
subscales. Both Stagnant Deliberation and Outcome Fantasy were
positively correlated with worry (PSWQ), depressive rumination
(RSQ), and depression symptoms. Likewise, mind wandering, as
measured by thought sampling during a task, is consistently associ-
ated with self-reported dysphoria across a wide range of tasks, includ-
ing word learning (Smallwood et al., 2003; Smallwood, O’Connor,
Sudberry, Haskell, & Ballantyne, 2004; Smallwood, O’Connor, Sud-
berry, & Obonsawin, 2007), sustained attention (Smallwood, Davies,
et al., 2004), and word fragment completion (Smallwood, O’Connor,
& Heim, 2005).
Prospective Longitudinal Studies
Main effect of RT. Prospective longitudinal studies have found
that the RSQ predicts (a) the future onset of a major depressive
episode across a range of follow-up periods in initially ND individuals
(Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; and Spasojevic &
Alloy, 2001, by using the same sample as Just & Alloy, 1997, found
that rumination mediated the effect of other risk factors on onset of
depression); (b) depressive symptoms across a range of follow-up
periods in initially ND individuals, after controlling for baseline
symptoms (Abela, Brozina, & Haigh, 2002; Butler & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1994; Hong, 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson,
1994; Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007; Sakamoto,
Kambara, & Tanno, 2001; J. A. J. Schwartz & Koenig, 1996; J. M.
Smith, Alloy, & Abramson, 2006); (c) depressive symptoms in pa-
tients with clinical depression, after controlling for baseline depres-
sion (Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Rohan, Sig-
mon, & Dorhofer, 2003), although one non-replication should be
noted (88 college students with recent onset major depressive episode,
follow-up after 6 months; reported in both Kasch, Klein, & Lara,
2001; Lara, Klein, & Kasch, 2000).
It is worth noting one limitation of the RSQ: RSQ items are
multidimensional, such that rumination assessed on the RSQ over-
laps conceptually with a number of other constructs including
depressive symptoms (Roberts et al., 1998; Treynor, Gonzalez, &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003), negative affectivity–neuroticism (Kasch
et al., 2001; Watson & Clark, 1984), and cognitive reactivity
(Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005; Segal, Gemar, & Williams, 1999;
Segal et al., 2006; Van der Does, 2002), each of which could
potentially account for the RSQ predicting prospective depression.
However, this concern has been offset by convergent evidence that
other measures of RT predict depression. First, other measures of
depressive rumination predicted future depressive mood: (a) diary
studies in which participants recorded their moods and responses
to their moods every day for at least 2 weeks, for both undergrad-
uates (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993) and pa-
tients with seasonal affective disorder (Young & Azam, 2003); (b)
rumination ratings of interview transcripts about a gay male part-
ner’s recent death from AIDS (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1997); and
(c) experience sampling methodology in which momentary rumi-
native self-focus reported in response to randomly timed beeps on
an electronic watch predicted negative affect at the subsequent
recording point (on average 1.5 hr later), after controlling for T1
negative affect (Moberly & Watkins, in press).
Second, forms of RT other than depressive rumination predict
future levels of depression in prospective longitudinal studies includ-
ing (a) the Rumination to Sadness Scale in depressed patients with
7-month follow-up (Raes et al., 2006); (b) the Emotion Control
Questionnaire—Rehearsal subscale with 8-week follow-up (Rector &
Roger, 1996); (c) Stagnant Deliberation and Outcome Fantasy sub-
scales on the MMAP predicted depression symptoms 13 weeks later
in 1st year law students, after controlling for initial levels of depres-
sion (Feldman & Hayes, 2005); (d) habitual negative self-thinking
predicted depressive symptoms 9 months later, after controlling for
baseline depression, negative life events, and dysfunctional attitudes
in 1,102 Norwegian citizens (Verplanken et al., 2007); and (e) with an
8-month follow-up, rumination about negative content predicted fu-
ture depression and mediated the effects of depressive rumination in
predicting depression (Ito, Takenaka, & Agari, 2005; Ito, Takenaka,
Tomita, & Agari, 2006).
Effect of RT moderated by context. Several studies reported
moderating relationships between depressive rumination and in-
trapersonal variables in predicting future depression. First, within
the Temple–Wisconsin Cognitive Vulnerability to Depression
project, in which undergraduates selected for high and low risk on
negative cognitive style were followed up for 2.5 years, an inter-
action of negative cognitive style and stress-reactive rumination
significantly predicted the rate, number, and duration of major
depressive episodes, even after controlling for level of depression
at T1 (Just & Alloy, 1997; Robinson & Alloy, 2003; for other
Cognitive Vulnerability to Depression studies, see J. M. Smith et
al., 2006; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). Stress-reactive rumination
assessed the tendency to ruminate about negative inferences fol-
lowing stressful events by adapting the RSQ (e.g., “Think about
how the stressful event was all your fault,” Robinson & Alloy,
2003). Negative cognitive style was assessed by the Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale (Weissman & Beck, 1978), which indexes the
endorsement of maladaptive, perfectionistic beliefs about the con-
tingencies necessary to demonstrate self-worth (e.g., “If I do not do
well all the time people will not respect me”) and by the Cognitive
Style Questionnaire, which assesses attributions about the inter-
nality, stability, and globality of events and inferences about the
consequences of events for self-worth. Stress-reactive rumination
predicted future episodes of major depression in individuals with
high levels of negative cognitive style, but not in individuals with
low levels of negative cognitive style.
Second, trait depressive rumination, self-esteem, and stressful
life events interacted in predicting maintenance of depression over
a 6-week period in mildly depressed undergraduates (Ciesla &
175 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHTRoberts, 2007). Depressive rumination predicted depression at
follow-up only among participants with both low self-esteem and
a high level of stressful life events. Third, depressive rumination
interacted with baseline depression symptoms to predict future
depression (Nolan, Roberts, & Gotlib, 1998; Roelofs, Muris, Hul-
bers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2006). Moreover, one study found that
depressive rumination interacted with stressful life events to pre-
dict future depression, indicating that situational context can mod-
erate the effects of rumination (Morrison & O’Connor, 2005).
Thus, across these studies, the unconstructive consequences of
depressive rumination occurred only in individuals with more
negative self-beliefs, more pessimistic attributions, more de-
pressed mood, or negative life events.
Effect of RT moderated by thought content. Factor analyses of
the RSQ have identified distinct subtypes of depressive rumina-
tion: Brooding versus Reflective Pondering (Treynor et al., 2003),
Dwelling on the Negative versus Active Cognitive Appraisal
(Fresco et al., 2002), and Symptom-Focused Rumination versus
Introspection versus Self-Blame (Roberts et al., 1998). Across
these distinctions, the subtypes linked to more unconstructive
consequences (Brooding, Dwelling on the Negative, Self-Blame)
all share a common theme as reflected in scale items, that is,
negative, self-critical, evaluative (e.g., “Why can’t I handle things
better?”), judgmental, and comparative thinking about the self
(e.g., “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). The evidence is strongest for the
distinction between Brooding and Reflective Pondering, which
was found when the RSQ was factor analyzed once the items
referring to symptoms of depression were removed. Brooding is
characterized by “moody pondering” (Treynor et al., 2003, p. 251),
whereas Reflective Pondering is characterized by items such as
“Analyze recent events to understand why you are depressed” and
was interpreted “as a purposeful turning inward to engage in
cognitive problem solving to alleviate one’s depressive symptoms”
(Treynor et al., 2003, p. 256). Brooding measured at T1 predicted
both increased concurrent depression and increased future depres-
sion assessed 1 year later, even after controlling for depression
levels at T1, whereas Reflective Pondering measured at T1 pre-
dicted increased concurrent depression but reduced future depres-
sion assessed 1 year later (Treynor et al., 2003). In adolescents,
Brooding but not Reflective Pondering predicted the development
of depressive symptoms over time (Burwell & Shirk, 2007). Fur-
thermore, in patients with major depression, Brooding but not
Reflective Pondering was significantly correlated with an atten-
tional bias toward sad facial expressions relative to neutral facial
expressions, as assessed on a facial dot-probe task, after control-
ling for level of depressive symptoms (Joormann, Dkane, & Got-
lib, 2006). These results suggest that thought valence and content
during RT may moderate its consequences, with the negative,
self-critical thinking typical of brooding being more maladaptive.
Limitations. A general limitation of these longitudinal pro-
spective studies is that many studies have not factored prior
episodes of the relevant disorder (e.g., prior major depression as
opposed to depressive symptoms) into the analyses. As such, the
possibility that past major depressive episodes is a common factor
linking RT and prospective depression cannot be ruled out. For
example, if RT is the result of “scarring” from a previous episode,
then this relationship could explain why RT is associated with
increased risk for future depression.
Experimental Studies
Main effect of RT. Studies that experimentally manipulated RT
in the form of worry, by asking participants to briefly worry about
a self-chosen concern, found that worry increases depressed mood
in normal participants (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Behar, Zuel-
lig, & Borkovec, 2005; Borkovec et al., 1983; McLaughlin, Bork-
ovec, & Sibrava, 2007; see the review in Borkovec et al., 1998)
and produces a short-term increase in negative intrusive thoughts,
relative to relaxation or visual imagery or no instruction conditions
(Borkovec et al., 1983; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995; York, Bork-
ovec, Vasey, & Stern, 1987). Experimental studies have also
demonstrated that trait predisposition toward RT increases emo-
tional reactivity to negative mood inductions and mood challenges,
particularly when participants are provided with a delay period that
allows the opportunity to ruminate (Conway et al., 2000; Thomsen,
Jorgensen, Mehlsen, & Zachariae, 2004).
Effect of RT moderated by intrapersonal context. Moreover, a
series of studies provided convergent evidence that RT in the form
of depressive rumination plays a causal role in a range of uncon-
structive outcomes associated with depression, including exacer-
bating negative affect and increasing negative cognition (for fur-
ther details, see Table 1). These studies used a standardized
rumination induction, in which participants are instructed to spend
8 minutes concentrating on a series of sentences that involve
rumination about themselves, their current feelings and physical
state, and the causes and consequences of their feelings (e.g.,
“Think about the way you feel inside”; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). As a con-
trol condition, a distraction induction is typically used in which
participants are instructed to spend 8 minutes concentrating on a
series of sentences that involve imagining visual scenes that are
unrelated to the self or to current feelings (e.g., “Think about a fire
darting round a log in a fire place”).
Compared with the distraction induction, the rumination induc-
tion is reliably found to have negative consequences on mood and
cognition. Critically, the differential effects of these manipulations
are found only when participants are already in a dysphoric mood
before the manipulations, indicating a moderating role for intrap-
ersonal context. Under these conditions, compared with distrac-
tion, rumination exacerbates negative mood (Lavender & Watkins,
2004; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Morrow & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Watkins &
Teasdale, 2001), increases negative thinking (Lyubomirsky &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), increases negative autobiographical
memory recall (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema,
1998), reduces the specificity of autobiographical memory re-
trieval (Kao, Dritschel, & Astell, 2006; Park, Goodyer, & Teas-
dale, 2004; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Watkins, Teasdale, &
Williams, 2000; see Williams et al., 2007, for a discussion),
increases negative thinking about the future (Lavender & Watkins,
2004), impairs concentration and central executive functioning
(Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003; Watkins & Brown, 2002),
impairs controlled memory retrieval (Hertel, 1998), and impairs
social problem solving (Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Lyubomirsky &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg,
1999). Likewise, when they ruminated after a negative mood
induction, dysphoric individuals recalled more negative memories,
whereas non-dysphoric individuals recalled more positive memo-
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found for both dysphoric, non-clinical participants and for de-
pressed patients (e.g., Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Lavender &
Watkins, 2004; Park et al., 2004; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins
& Brown, 2002; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001), suggesting that the
effects generalize to clinical samples.
Extending the role of intrapersonal context, Ciesla and Roberts
(2007) found that the effect of trait predisposition toward depres-
sive rumination (RSQ) on subsequent emotional response was
moderated by dysfunctional attitudes and self-esteem, such that
following a negative mood induction, higher levels of trait rumi-
nation were associated with higher levels of dysphoric affect after
an 8-minute no-task delay period in participants with low self-
esteem or high dysfunctional attitudes but not in participants with
high self-esteem or low dysfunctional attitudes. Moreover, self-
esteem and dysfunctional attitudes interacted with the rumination
versus distraction manipulations after a sad mood induction to
predict later levels of dysphoria, such that individuals with lower
self-esteem and more dysfunctional attitudes had elevated dyspho-
ric mood, with this effect stronger in the rumination condition than
in the distraction condition (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007).
Markman and Miller (2006) further extended the moderating
effect of level of depression on the consequences of RT to forms
of RT other than depressive rumination. A sample of students with
a range of depressive symptoms (non-depressed, ND; mild-to-
moderately depressed, MD; severely depressed, SD) generated
upward counterfactuals about a recent negative academic outcome
(Markman & Miller, 2006). There was a greater reduction in
negative evaluation of the event following RT for the ND and MD
participants than for the SD participants. Further, MD participants
generated a greater proportion of counterfactuals focusing on spe-
cific controllable behaviors relative to uncontrollable, enduring
qualities of the self than did the ND and SD participants. In turn,
the SD participants generated more counterfactuals involving char-
acterological self-blame than did the ND and MD participants.
Thus, RT was unconstructive in the SD group but constructive in
the MD depressed group.
Effect of RT moderated by concrete versus abstract processing
during RT. The effect of trait predisposition toward RT on emo-
tional reactivity is moderated by the thinking style adopted by
participants. Increasing trait predisposition toward RT (as assessed
on the Action Control Scale—Preoccupation; Kuhl, 1994; sample
item “When I am in a competition and have lost every time, the
thought that I lost keeps running through my mind”) was corre-
lated with slower emotional recovery following a prior failure
experience (Watkins, 2004a) and greater emotional reactivity to a
subsequent failure experience (Moberly & Watkins, 2006), but
only in participants manipulated into adopting an abstract, evalu-
ative mindset focused on the causes, meanings, and implications of
events. Watkins (2004a) randomly allocated participants to expres-
sive writing about a previously induced failure in either an ab-
stract, evaluative way (e.g., “Why did you feel this way?”) or a
concrete, experiential way (e.g., “How did you feel moment-by-
moment?”). At higher levels of preoccupation, levels of negative
mood 12 hours after the failure were greater, but only in individ-
uals who wrote in the abstract, evaluative way and not in individ-
uals who wrote in the more concrete, experiential way. Moberly
and Watkins (2006) trained participants to repetitively think about
emotional scenarios, either imagining the concrete details of what
is happening in each scenario or evaluating the causes, meanings,
and implications of each scenario, prior to an unanticipated failure
experience. After the failure experience, higher levels of trait
preoccupation were significantly correlated with lower levels of
positive affect, but only for participants in the evaluative condition
and not for participants in the concrete condition.
Limitations. A limitation of many experimental studies com-
paring rumination versus distraction is the lack of a no-
intervention control making it impossible to determine whether the
distinct consequences are due to active negative effects of rumi-
nation and/or active positive effects of distraction. However, se-
lecting an appropriate control condition is difficult in dysphoric
participants: A passive control condition that involves “doing
nothing” may simply allow naturally occurring rumination to
continue (e.g., Hertel, 1998), whereas any active control condition
may act as a distraction. Nonetheless, a number of other experi-
mental manipulations of RT, for example, of worry, also included
a no-intervention control and replicated the finding that RT in-
creased depression, consistent with RT having an active detrimen-
tal effect.
Summary of RT and Vulnerability to Depression
This review reveals that there is an extensive body of findings
suggesting that RT is involved in the onset and maintenance of
depression, with both depressive rumination and a range of other
types of RT predicting future depression in longitudinal prospec-
tive studies as well as increasing negative affect when experimen-
tally induced. Thus, there is convergent evidence across numerous
studies utilizing different populations, different measures (RSQ,
interview, self-report), different study designs, and different forms
of RT, all of which are consistent with the hypothesis that RT is a
process underpinning the onset and development of depression.
RT and Vulnerability to Anxiety
Cross-Sectional Studies
In non-clinical samples, RT is significantly and positively cor-
related with increased levels of concurrent trait and state anxiety,
whether assessed as worry (e.g., Davey, Hampton, Farrell, &
Davidson, 1992; Meyer et al., 1990; Siddique, LaSalle-Ricci,
Glass, Arnkoff, & Diaz, 2006), Stagnant Deliberation, Outcome
Fantasy, Problem Analysis (Feldman & Hayes, 2005), global ru-
mination (Harrington & Blakenship, 2002), rumination about a
traumatic event (Steil & Ehlers, 2000), or emotional processing
(Stanton, Danoff-Burg, et al., 2000).
Moreover, RT is a key element of a number of anxiety disorders
(Chelminski & Zimmerman, 2003; Harvey et al., 2004): general-
ized anxiety disorder, social anxiety, and posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). Chronic worry is a central and defining charac-
teristic of generalized anxiety disorder (American Psychiatric As-
sociation, 1994; Hoyer, Becker, & Margraf, 2002). Within social
anxiety, post-event rumination has been identified as an important
process: Compared with low-anxious control participants, individ-
uals with high social anxiety and patients with a diagnosis of social
anxiety demonstrate significantly more post-event RT following
social interactions, performing mental “post-mortems” on how the
interaction went and how they performed (Abbott & Rapee, 2004;
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Flett, 2005; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Perini, Abbott, & Rapee,
2006; Rachman, Gruter-Andrew, & Shafran, 2000; Rapee &
Heimberg, 1997).
RT has also been implicated as an important process in the
development of PTSD. Ehlers and colleagues have conceptualized
RT about a traumatic event as a causal mechanism in the devel-
opment of PTSD. By using brief self-report measures of RT about
an identified traumatic event (e.g., “Do you go over and over what
happened again and again?”), they have found RT to be elevated
in patients with PTSD compared with RT in non-clinical control
participants (e.g., Ehlers, Mayou & Bryant, 1998). Likewise, in
survivors of physical assault, the frequency of counterfactual
thoughts was positively correlated with PTSD symptoms such as
intrusions about the negative event (El Leithy, Brown, & Robbins,
2006), and for women who had experienced recurrent miscarriage,
upward counterfactual thinking was positively correlated with
anxiety (Callander & Brown, 2007). Similarly, counterfactual
thinking following uncontrollable and traumatic events, such as
sudden infant death, is associated with a greater level of distress
(C. G. Davis, Lehman, Wortman, Silver, & Thompson, 1995).
Prospective Longitudinal Studies
In non-clinical samples, RT has been found to predict (a) ele-
vated levels of self-reported anxiety in undergraduates following
their midterm exams, after controlling for baseline anxiety (Sarin,
Abela, & Auerbach, 2005; Segerstrom et al., 2000); (b) prospec-
tive increases in anxiety for law students before and after their first
semester final exams (Siddique et al., 2006); (c) prospective in-
creases in anxiety over 1 month (Hong, 2007), over 6–8 weeks
(Calmes & Roberts, 2007), and over 9 months (Verplanken et al.,
2007); and (d) the onset and severity of posttraumatic stress
symptoms following traumatic events such as the Lomo Prieta
earthquake of 1989 (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Further-
more, following traumatic events, RT about the trauma predicts the
persistence of PTSD in prospective longitudinal studies from 6
months to 3 years later, for road accidents (Ehlers, Mayou, &
Bryant, 1998, 2003; Holeva, Tarrier, & Wells, 2001; Mayou,
Bryant, & Ehlers, 2001; Mayou, Ehlers, & Bryant, 2002; Murray,
Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002), assaults (Halligan, Michael, Clark, &
Ehlers, 2003; Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005), and in
ambulance workers (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999).
Experimental Studies
Main effects of RT. In experimental studies, RT has been
found to increase anxiety, whether the RT consists of brief periods
of worry about self-chosen concerns (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988;
Behar et al., 2005; Borkovec et al., 1983; McLaughlin et al., 2007)
or a rumination manipulation that exacerbates pre-existing anxious
mood (Blagden & Craske, 1996). When university students were
asked to describe a distressing event that occurred in the last 2
years and then randomly allocated to rumination (prompts like
“Why has this event happened to me?”) or distraction (a word
generation task), rumination resulted in a greater increase in neg-
ative affect and higher levels of intrusive memories than did
distraction (Ehring, Szeimies, & Schaffrick, 2007), suggesting a
potential causal role for rumination in the development of post-
traumatic symptoms.
Effect of RT moderated by interpersonal and situational context.
Kashdan and Roberts (2007) found that there was an interactive
effect of intrapersonal and situational context on the consequences
of post-event rumination for next-day negative affect following a
social situation. Unacquainted undergraduates engaged in 45-
minute interactions with randomly paired opposite-sex partners,
working through questions structured to induce either personal
self-disclosure (e.g., “What is your most treasured memory?”) or
to mimic small talk (“What is the best TV show you’ve seen?”).
For individuals with higher levels of trait social anxiety, post-event
rumination for the 24 hours post-event was associated with in-
creases in negative affect following personal disclosure but asso-
ciated with decreases in negative affect following small talk
(Kashdan & Roberts, 2007). There was no interaction between
rumination and situation in predicting negative affect for individ-
uals with lower levels of social anxiety. Thus, in a situational
context that was more personally revealing and, presumably, more
meaningful and threatening for individuals high in social anxiety,
post-event rumination had more negative consequences.
Effect of RT moderated by concrete versus abstract processing
during RT. In an analogue study of posttraumatic stress symp-
toms, undergraduates watched a distressing film showing the af-
termath of motor vehicle accidents, known to induce negative
affect and intrusions, and were then randomly allocated to abstract
rumination, concrete rumination, or distraction (Ehring et al.,
2007). Across time, abstract rumination resulted in slower recov-
ery from negative affect than did concrete rumination or distrac-
tion. Moreover, concrete rumination resulted in fewer negative
intrusions than did abstract rumination and distraction, which did
not differ from each other. Thus, these results suggest that abstract
rumination may be particularly unconstructive following exposure
to a distressing event.
RT and Impaired Physical Health
Consistent with the perseverative cognition hypothesis
(Brosschot et al., 2006), RT correlates with indices of poor phys-
ical health and prospectively predicts health-related outcomes.
Cross-Sectional Studies
First, RT is associated with increases in cortisol secretion, which
is an index of activation of the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal
axis, whether assessed as worry (Schlotz, Hellhammer, Schulz, &
Stone, 2004) or Rehearsal (Roger & Najarian, 1998). Second,
high-trait worry is associated with suppression of the expected
increase in natural killer immune cells when experimentally ex-
posed to a fearful situation (Segerstrom, Glover, Craske, & Fahey,
1999) and with reduced natural killer immune cells in response to
a naturally occurring trauma (Segerstrom, Solomon, Kemeny, &
Fahey, 1998). Third, RT is associated with dysregulated cardio-
vascular function: Worry is associated with reduced heart rate
variability and increased heart rate (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Bork-
ovec, Lyonfields, Wiser, & Deihl, 1993; Brosschot & Thayer,
2003; Lyonfields, Borkovec, & Thayer, 1995); RT (Rehearsal) is
associated with delayed heart rate recovery following a challeng-
ing task (Roger & Jamieson, 1988; Roger & Najarian, 1989).
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activity and a risk factor for increased mortality, specifically
associated with hypertension and cardiovascular disorders (P. K.
Stein & Kleiger, 1999). Fourth, high levels of depressive rumina-
tion are associated with delay in presenting the symptoms of breast
cancer to a healthcare professional (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, Chang, &
Chung, 2006), and RT is associated with more physical symptoms
in women undergoing a breast cancer prevention trial (Segerstrom
et al., 2003). Fifth, RT has also been implicated in the development
of insomnia (Gross & Borkovec, 1982; Harvey, 2000; Nelson &
Harvey, 2002). Insomnia is associated with increased pre-sleep
worry (Harvey, 2000), and RT is associated with poorer sleep
quality and longer time to fall asleep (Thomsen, Mehlsen, Chris-
tensen, & Zachariae, 2003).
Prospective Longitudinal Studies
Increased RT prospectively predicts (a) increased heart disease
over a 20-year follow-up doubling the risk for high worriers
compared with low worriers (Kubzansky et al., 1997); (b) in-
creased somatic health complaints in high school students, with the
use of a controlled worry period reducing subsequent somatic
complaints (Brosschot & van der Doef, 2006); (c) higher levels of
fatigue over a 10-month follow-up (Andrea et al., 2004); (d)
slower recovery and impaired wound healing following surgery for
hernias (E. Broadbent, Petrie, Alley, & Booth, 2003); (e) fewer
natural killer cells in the months after the Northridge earthquake
(Segerstrom et al., 1998); (f) slower clearing of psoriasis in re-
sponse to psoralen-UV-A photochemotherapy (Fortune et al.,
2003); (g) reduced functional status and reduced grip strength 1
year after the diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis (Evers, Kraaimaat,
Geenen, & Bijlsma, 1998); and (h) self-reported physical health
problems 1 year later in 20–35-year-olds and increased health care
utilization over the subsequent year in 70–85-year-olds (Thomsen,
Mehlsen, Hokland, et al., 2004, Thomsen, Mehlsen, Olesen, et al.,
2004).
Experimental Studies
Consistent with the hypothesis that RT plays a causal role in
poor physical health, experimental manipulations of RT have been
shown to influence health-related indices. First, experimental in-
duction of rumination about a previous emotionally stressful task
results in increased blood pressure (BP) and delayed recovery of
BP, whereas distraction facilitates BP recovery (Glynn, Christen-
feld, & Gerin, 2002). Second, trait anger rumination predicts
prolonged elevated BP after recalling an angry event (A. R.
Schwartz et al., 2000) or after an anger provocation (Suchday,
Carter, Ewart, Larkin, & Desiderato, 2004). High sustained BP is
a risk factor for many diseases including cardiovascular disease
and diabetes. Third, compared with distraction, rumination about a
mid-session exam resulted in more pre-sleep intrusive thoughts
and poorer ratings of sleep quality for high-trait ruminators but not
for low-trait ruminators (Guastella & Moulds, 2007). Fourth, Nel-
son and Harvey (2002) gave patients with insomnia a speech threat
just prior to bedtime. Thinking about giving the speech in images
produced more initial distress and self-reported arousal but shorter
sleep onset latency than did worrying about the speech verbally.
RT With Constructive Consequences
There is also a growing literature indicating how RT can be
adaptive, functional, and beneficial, although, as noted earlier, the
constructive consequences of RT have been less investigated than
the unconstructive consequences of RT. The relevant studies are
summarized in Table 2. The main emergent findings are that RT is
implicated in (a) successful cognitive processing and recovery
from upsetting and traumatic events, (b) adaptive preparation and
planning for the future, (c) recovery from depression, and (d)
uptake of health-promoting behaviors.
RT and Successful Cognitive Processing of Stress, Loss,
and Trauma
Cross-Sectional Studies
Main effects of RT. A number of studies have found that,
following stressful or traumatic events, RT in the form of cognitive
processing is associated with acceptance and recovery. People who
actively think about the trauma and its implications are more likely
to find meaning or to experience growth than people who do not
dwell on the trauma (J. E. Bower et al., 1998; Calhoun et al., 2000;
Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004; Ullrich & Lutgendorf, 2002). Extent of
RT after a traumatic or stressful event was positively associated
with more posttraumatic growth, as indexed by self-reported in-
creases in relating to others, discovering new possibilities, discov-
ering personal strength, and increased appreciation of life (Cal-
houn et al., 2000). For example, RT immediately after a child’s
death was associated with posttraumatic growth in bereaved par-
ents, whereas more recent RT was not, and, in older adults, growth
attributed to the struggle with their most stressful events was
associated with frequency of rumination across all traumatic
events (Calhoun, Tedeschi, Fulmer, & Harlan, 2000; and Tedeschi,
Calhoun, & Cooper, 2000; both cited in Tedeschi et al., 2004).
Similarly, RT, which was defined as recurrent event-related
thoughts that help one understand, resolve, and make sense of
trauma-related events, was correlated with competency beliefs
about ability to handle problems arising from the trauma in chil-
dren evacuated because of Hurricane Floyd (Cryder, Kilmer, Te-
deschi, & Calhoun, 2006).
Effects of RT moderated by thought content. Segerstrom and
colleagues (2003) examined the nature of RT and its role in
adjustment in women who were exposed to a stressful situation
through being identified at high risk for breast cancer. In previous
undergraduate studies, (Segerstrom et al., 2003, Studies 1 and 2),
multidimensional scaling across large samples of structured mea-
sures of ruminative thinking and sampled thoughts concerning
rumination had revealed that RT could be described on two inde-
pendent structural dimensions: valence of content (negative vs.
positive) and purpose. As thought content became more negative,
affect was rated as more negative. The purpose dimension re-
flected the goals motivating rumination, with two extremes of
purpose: searching for new ideas and experiences versus solving
problems and improving certainty and predictability. Solving was
defined as “trying to narrow down, to make sure, to make plans or
to declare knowledge” (Segerstrom et al., 2003, p. 916). Examples
included causal statements, summary statements, statements of
definite consequences, and planning. Searching was defined as
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Studies Demonstrating Constructive Consequences of Repetitive Thought
Author Design and sample Measure Main finding
Cross-sectional studies
Belzer et al. (2002) 353 u/g’s PSWQ, Catastrophic worry
questionnaire, STAI,
SPSI–R
Rational problem solving (constructive) & impulsiveness/
carelessness (unconstructive) positively correlated with
worry, after controlling trait anxiety & problem
orientation
Calhoun et al. (2000) 54 u/g’s with traumatic event in
past 3 yrs
PTGI, rumination (items
derived existing
measures)
Early event-related rumination after trauma positively
correlated with post-traumatic growth
Cryder et al. (2006) 46 children evacuated for
Hurricane Floyd
Rumination, competency
beliefs, PTGI
Rumination correlated positively with competency beliefs
but not with post-traumatic growth, although
competency beliefs correlated with post-traumatic
growth
Davey et al. (1992) Study 1: 105 u/g’s; Study 2:
108 u/g’s; Study 3: 94 u/g’s
& p/g’s
All studies: STAI, Student
Worry Scale. Study 1, 2:
Coping with stress,
Study 3: Miller
Behavioral Style scale-
monitoring
Study 1, 2: Worry correlated with trait anxiety. When
trait anxiety controlled, worry positively correlated
self-reported strategies of active behavioral coping,
information-seeking, affective regulation. Study 3:
When trait anxiety held constant, worry positively
correlated monitoring.
El Leithy et al.
(2006)
46 victims of physical assault IES–R, fluency &
frequency of
counterfactuals
Fluency of counterfactual thinking positively correlated
with generation of behavioral plans
Feldman & Hayes
(2005)
Study 3; 325 u/g’s MMAP, Reflection, SPSI–
R, MASQ
Study 3: Plan rehearsal negatively correlated depression,
positively correlated well-being
Perkins & Corr
(2005)
68 salespeople PSWQ, ability, job perfor-
mance
Worry correlated with better job performance but only in
high ability individuals
Schorr & Roemer
(2002)
141 students reporting trauma/
loss
PTGI, “searching for a
way to make sense of
experience”
Attempts to make sense (RT) associated post-traumatic
growth
Segerstrom et al.
(2003)
Study 1: 978 u/g’s; Study 2: 25
u/g’s
Study 3: 62 women in breast
cancer prevention trial
Study 1: Emotional
processing, IES, PSWQ,
RSQ, RRQ, NEO–FFI
Study 2, 3: self-
generated descriptions of
RT, ratings of affect
Study 3, CES–D, quality
of life, IES, STAI
Study 1: Multidimensional scaling revealed Valence
dimension (positive vs. negative), Purpose dimension
(openness to experience vs. clarity & worry). Study 2:
Independent sorting of descriptions resulted in
dimensions of Valence (positive vs. negative), Content
(achievement vs. interpersonal), Purpose (searching vs.
solving). Valence dimension associated affect ratings.
Study 3: More negative RT associated more negativity,
worse mental health, more anxiety, more physical
symptoms. When thought valence positive, searching
decreased ratings of physical health and positivity;
when thought valence negative, searching increased
ratings of physical health and positivity
Szabo & Lovibond
(2006)
39 u/g’s 7 day diary of worry
episodes
A large % of worry involved problem-solving attempts,
sometimes leading to satisfying solutions
Trapnell & Campbell
(1999)
u/g’s: n  441, n  570, n 
710
RRQ, NEO–FF, BDI Reflection scale not correlated with depressive symptoms
(r  .04, r  .08) but correlated with openness to
experience (r  .61)
Verhaegen et al.
(2005)
99 u/g’s Reflection from RSQ,
CES–D
Reflective pondering related to current depression, self-
rated creative interests & creative fluency originality
and elaboration
Longitudinal studies
Bower et al. (1998) Bereavement interview at T1,
then blood samples every 6
mths for 2–3 years. 40 HIV
seropositive men after AIDS-
related bereavement
Interview transcripts:
cognitive processing,
discovery of meaning,
CES–D, CD4 T-cells,
mortality
Cognitive processing significantly associated with
discovery of meaning. Discovery of meaning at T1
associated decrease in rate of CD4 decline T1 to T2
and decreased rate of AIDS-related mortality
Cantor et al. (1987) Transition to college. T1  1
st
semester, T2  2
nd semester;
147 u/g’s
DPQ, GPA, reflectivity 
no. of ideas generated
for coping plans
Reflectivity at T1 positively associated GPA at T2;
higher reflectivity predicted higher GPA in DP but
lower GPA in OP
Ciesla & Roberts
(2002)
Response to group treatment;
32 MDD patients
RSQ, DAS, RSE, BDI Rumination interacted with cognitive style to predict
change in depression: in high self-esteem, low DAS
group, rumination predicted better outcome
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Author Design and sample Measure Main finding
Longitudinal studies
Dijkstra & Brosschot
(2003)
T2  8 mths; 380 smokers, 324
ex-smokers
T1: worry about health,
self-efficacy,
disengagement beliefs.
T2 smoking behavior
In smokers, increased worry at T1 predicted more quit
attempts T1 to T2, more so in group with high
self-efficacy
In ex-smokers, worry predicted relapse, especially in low
self-efficacy, high disengagement beliefs group
Feldman & Hayes
(2005)
Study 4. T1 start of 1
st
semester; T2 end of 1
st
semester after 13 weeks; 110
1
st year law students
MMAP, Reflection, SPSI–
R, MASQ
Study 4: plan rehearsal at T1 predicted reduced
depression at T2, although no longer sign when
controlling T1 depression
Hay et al. (2006) Meta-analysis of 12 prospective
studies; 3,342 high-risk &
general population women
Breast cancer worry at T1,
T2 breast examination,
mammography use
Breast cancer worry has small but reliable (r  0.12)
positive correlation with breast cancer
screening-behavior; greater worry predicts greater
likelihood of screening
Siddique et al.
(2006)
T1  law school orientation;
T2  1 mth prior to 1
st
semester final exam, T3 
post 1
st semester final exam;
T4  1 mth prior oral
argument; T5  oral
argument, 2
nd semester; 184
1
st year law students
PSWQ, self-efficacy,
STAI, final exam scores,
performance rating for
oral argument
After controlling for trait anxiety, T1 worry significantly
predicted better T3 exam performance & better T5 oral
argument performance, & higher state anxiety at T2,
T3, T4
Treynor et al. (2003) T2  1 yr; 1,130 community
sample
RSQ, BDI Reflective pondering subscale at T1 predicted less
depression at T2 controlling for depression at T1
Yamada et al. (2003) T2  6 mths after
pharmacotherapy; 105 MDD
patients
HRSD, rumination
questionnaire
Rumination at T1 predicted reduced depression at T2
Experimental studies
Lyubomirsky et al.
(2003)
(Study 1): RUM vs. DIS vs.
planning, 45 Dys u/g’s (BDI
 15) vs. 46 Non-dys (BDI
 3) u/g’s
Ratings sadness &
depression, reading task,
interfering thoughts
(CIQ)
Study 1: dysphoric mood, time spend reading passage,
interfering thoughts in dysphoric: Repetitive planning
 distraction  rumination
Moberly & Watkins
(2006)
Training to focus on emotional
scenarios, abstract vs.
concrete, prior to failure; 61
u/g’s
PANAS, ACS–P, BDI After failure, higher levels of trait RT were associated
with lower levels of positive affect, but only in
abstract condition, not in concrete condition
Norem & Illingworth
(1993)
Study 1: thought-listing re
positive & negative outcomes
(reflection) vs. distraction; 26
DP vs. 30 OP. Study 2: Rate
goal progress vs. no progress;
nursing students, 13 DP vs.
11 OP
DPQ. Study 1: POMS,
STAI, mental arithmetic
task. Study 2: ESM 4
times a day for 7 days,
rating affect
Study 1: Negative mood & anxiety: For DP, distraction
 thought-listing; for OP, thought-listing  distraction
Math performance - for DP, thought-listing  distraction
Study 2: DP who rated progress felt more positive and
rated situations as easier than those who did not; OP
who rated progress felt made less progress than those
who did not
Pham & Taylor
(1999)
Process vs. outcome vs.
combined simulation vs.
control, all daily for 1 wk.
101 u/g’s 1 wk before
midterm exam
No. of study hours,
planning, worry,
confidence, grades
Negative emotion: Process-simulation  no-process-
simulation. Planning, number of hours of study, exam
grades: Process-simulation  no process-simulation.
Exam grades: Outcome simulation  no-outcome
simulation
Rimes & Watkins
(2005)
Experiential RUM vs. analytical
RUM; 30 MDD patients, 30
controls
BDI, RSQ, VAS ratings of
mood & global negative
self-judgments
In MDD patients, analytical RUM increased post-
manipulation global judgments of worthlessness
relative to experiential RUM. No effect of condition in
controls
Rivkin & Taylor
(1999)
Process-simulation on how
problem arose and unfolded
vs. outcome simulation vs.
control; 77 u/g’s designate
ongoing stressful event
Emotional self-ratings,
COPE immediately after
and 1 wk later
Immediate positive affect: Process  outcome  control
One week later, positive reinterpretation, use of social
support: Process  outcome  control
Showers (1992) Concrete positive-outcome-
focus vs. concrete negative-
outcome-focus on upcoming
conversation Study 1: 40 OPs
vs. 38 DPs in social
situations. Study 2: 27 OPs,
31 DPs
Study 1: Time talking
during conversation,
confederate &
participant ratings. Study
2: thought listing as
anticipate conversation
Study 1: Negative-focus DP talked more, rated more
positively by confederate than positive-focus DP, no
effect of focus on Ops Study 2: negative-focus DPs
reported more positive self-relevant thoughts than
positive-focus DPs, no effect of focus on OPs
(table continues)
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(Segerstrom et al., 2003, p. 916). Examples included expressions
of uncertainty, generating options, indecision or confusion, listing
multiple possibilities, and learning new perspectives or ways. In
the breast cancer study, the valence of thought content during RT
predicted concurrent affect and well-being: Less negative content
during RT was associated with less negative affect, more positive
affect, better overall mental health, less anxiety, and fewer phys-
ical symptoms (Segerstrom et al., 2003). Furthermore, there were
also interactions between valence and purpose on affect and rat-
ings of physical health: When the valence of RT content was
positive, a searching purpose was associated with decreased pos-
itive affect and decreased ratings of physical health, but when the
valence of thought content was negative, a searching purpose was
Table 2 (continued)
Author Design and sample Measure Main finding
Experimental studies
Spencer & Norem
(1996)
Coping imagery vs. mastery
imagery vs. relaxation 97
u/g’s, DP vs. OP
DPQ, performance on darts Dart performance - for DPs: Coping imagery  mastery
imagery  relaxation; for OPs: Relaxation  mastery
imagery  coping imagery
Taylor et al. (1998) Study 1, 3 Process-simulation
vs. outcome simulation vs.
control for 5–7 days. Study
1; 77 u/g’s 1 wk before 1st
midterm exam. Study 3, 84
u/g’s with project to
complete next wk. Study 4:
process-simulation on how
problem arose and unfolded
vs. outcome simulation vs.
control; 77 u/g’s with
ongoing stressful event
Study 1: Anxiety, time
spent studying, exam
grades. Study 3:
planning fallacy (project
began on time, finished
on time). Study 4:
emotional self-ratings,
COPE immediately after
and 1 wk later
Study 1: Hours of study, exam grades: Process-
simulation  outcome-simulation  control. Study 2:
% began on time: Process-simulation  outcome-
simulation  control; % finish on time: process 
outcome  control. Study 4: Immediate positive
affect: Process  outcome  control; One week later,
positive reinterpretation, use of social support: Process
 outcome  control
Ulrich & Lutgendorf
(2002)
Writing about stressful event
(cognitions & emotions vs.
emotions alone) vs. non-
expressive writing; 122 u/g’s
completed journals for 1 mth
Ratings of post-traumatic
growth
Reported post-traumatic growth: Writing cognition &
emotion  emotions alone  non-expressive writing
Watkins (2004a) Failure then 3 expressive
writing, abstract-evaluative
(why?) vs. concrete (how?);
69 community sample
ACS–P, BDI, MAACL,
IES
Higher levels of trait RT associated with higher levels of
negative mood 12 hr after failure in the evaluative
condition but not in the concrete writing condition
Watkins & Baracaia
(2002)
No questions vs. abstract Why?
Questions vs. concrete,
process, How? Questions
during concurrent MEPS; 32
CD; 26 RD; 26 ND
SCID, BDI, RSQ, MEPS Problem-solving effectiveness: In no question condition,
never-depressed (ND)  recovered depressed (RD) 
currently depressed (CD). In abstract Why condition,
ND  RD  CD. In concrete, process condition, ND
 RD  CD
Watkins & Moulds
(2005a)
Abstract RUM vs. concrete
RUM; 40 MDD patients; 40
controls
despondency, MEPS In MDD group, for problem-solving effectiveness,
concrete RUM  abstract RUM. No effect of
condition in controls
Watkins & Teasdale
(2001)
Analytical RUM vs.
experiential RUM vs. DIS vs.
abstraction; 36 MDD patients
despondency, AMT, BDI Despondency: Analytical RUM, experiential RUM (high
self-focus)  DIS, abstraction (low self-focus).
Increase in specificity of autobiographical memory:
Experiential RUM, DIS (low analytical)  analytical
RUM, abstraction (high analytical)
Watkins & Teasdale
(2004)
Analytical RUM vs.
experiential RUM; 28 MDD
patients
despondency, AMT Increase in specificity of autobiographical memory:
Experiential RUM  Analytical RUM
Note. ACS–P  Action Control Scale—Preoccupation; AMT  autobiographical memory test; ASQ  Attributional Style Questionnaire; BDI  Beck
Depression Inventory; CD  currently depressed group; CES–D  Centre for Epidemiological Survey—Depression; CIQ  Cognitive Interference
Questionnaire; COPE  the COPE Scale; DAS  Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; DIS  distraction manipulation; DP  defensive pessimist; DPQ 
Defensive Pessimism Questionnaire; Dys  dysphoric participants; ESM  experience sampling methodology; GOI  Goal Orientation Inventory;
HRSD  Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression; IES  Impact of Event Scale; MAACL  Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist; MASQ  Mood and
Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; MDE  major depressive episode; MDD  major depressive disorder; MEPS  Means Ends Problem Solving task;
MMAP  Measure of Mental Anticipatory Processes; ND  never-depressed group; NEO–FFI  NEO-Five Factor Inventory of Personality; NLEQ 
Negative Life Events Questionnaire; Non-Dys  non-dysphoric participants; OP  optimist; PANAS  Positive & Negative Affect Schedule; POMS 
Profile of Mood States scale; PSWQ  Penn State Worry Questionnaire; pts  participants; PTGI  posttraumatic growth inventory; RD  recovered
depressed group; RPA  Response to Positive Affect questionnaire; RRQ  Rumination & Reflection Questionnaire; RSE  Rosenberg Self-Esteem
questionnaire; RSQ  Response Styles Questionnaire; RT  repetitive thought; RUM  rumination manipulation; SCID  Structured Clinical Interview
for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; SPSI–R  Social Problem Solving Inventory—revised; STAI  State Trait Anxiety
Inventory; T1  initial baseline assessment, T2  follow-up assessment, u/g’s  undergraduates; VAS  Visual Analogue Scale.
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physical health. This pattern of results suggests that during RT
about negative content, RT with a searching, exploring purpose is
associated with more constructive outcomes than is RT with a
solving, making-sure purpose.
Prospective Longitudinal Studies
In a prospective study examining outcomes for HIV-
seropositive men who had experienced an AIDS-related bereave-
ment, RT about the bereavement was associated with finding more
meaning in the loss over the next 2–3 years, which in turn was
associated with better immune responses and reduced AIDs-
related mortality over a 7-year follow-up (J. E. Bower et al., 1998).
Finding meaning was operationalized as a major shift in values,
priorities, or perspectives in response to the loss. RT about be-
reavement was a necessary although not a sufficient condition for
discovery of meaning and improved physical health. Discovery of
meaning included the development of new personal growth goals,
an enhanced sense of living in the present, and the development of
new perspectives, such as “life is precious,” which are consistent
with the concept of finding benefit. Finding benefit is defined as
considering positive meanings of the traumatic event and positive
benefits or value learnt as a result of the event, and it is increas-
ingly hypothesized to be an important contributor to successful
cognitive processing of upsetting events (Affleck & Tennen, 1996;
King & Miner, 2000; Moskowitz, Folkman, Collette, & Vitting-
hoff, 1996). There is growing evidence from prospective longitu-
dinal studies that finding benefit predicts better future psycholog-
ical adjustment and more adaptive responses to negative life events
than does simply trying to understand and make sense of the event
(C. G. Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998; N. Stein, Folk-
man, Trabasso, & Richards, 1997; Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman,
1983; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004; Tugade, Fredrickson, & Bar-
rett, 2004).
Experimental Studies
Experimental studies of expressive writing, in which repeated
writing about distressing events was found to have more beneficial
consequences for psychological and physical health than those of
repeated writing about a neutral event, have provided broad evi-
dence consistent with a constructive effect for (at least a con-
strained form of) RT following distress (Foa, Molnar, & Cashman,
1995; Klein & Boals, 2001; Pennebaker, 1997; Pennebaker,
Mayne, & Francis, 1997; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999; Sloan &
Marx, 2004; Smyth, True, & Souto, 2001). For example, when
undergraduates completed journals for 1 month, those who wrote
about cognitions and emotions related to a stressful event had a
greater increase in self-reported posttraumatic growth than did
those who wrote only about emotions related to a stressful event or
who wrote factually about media events (Ullrich & Lutgendorf,
2002). As described earlier, Ehring et al. (2007) found experimen-
tal evidence that concrete RT about a distressing film resulted in
fewer intrusions about the film compared with abstract RT or
distraction.
Limitations
It is important to acknowledge that this cognitive processing and
posttraumatic growth literature has two major limitations: (a) The
majority of studies are only cross-sectional, and (b) the principal
outcome measures are self-report, leading to questions as to
whether reported benefits can be taken at face value or reflect
inaccurate, biased, or defensive perceptions (Nolen-Hoeksema &
Davis, 2004; Zoellner & Maercker, 2006).
RT Contributes to Adaptive Preparation and Anticipatory
Planning
There is convergent evidence that RT contributes to anticipatory
planning and adaptive self-regulation, consistent with the hypoth-
esis that RT can facilitate preparatory and adaptive behaviors
designed to reduce potential threats (Tallis & Eysenck, 1994).
Cross-Sectional Studies
RT is associated with better academic and workplace perfor-
mance and is correlated with constructive problem solving and
creativity. First, worry is associated with better workplace perfor-
mance but only for more able individuals (Perkins & Corr, 2005).
Second, after controlling for trait anxiety, worry is correlated with
increased report of active behavioral problem solving and seeking
more information in response to a recent stressful event (Davey et
al., 1992). Third, diary measures indicate that a large proportion of
worry reflects problem-solving attempts, which are often success-
ful (Szabo & Lovibond, 2004, 2006). Fourth, for survivors of
physical assault, upward counterfactual fluency, assessed in terms
of the number of different upward counterfactual thoughts gener-
ated about the trauma, was correlated with the generation of
behavioral plans (El Leithy et al., 2006). Fifth, reflectivity—
operationalized as the number of themes and ideas produced when
generating actions, outcomes, and consequences for coping plans
to hypothetical but common problem situations—is positively cor-
related with better subsequent academic performance for individ-
uals who preferentially use the defensive pessimism strategy but
negatively correlated with academic performance for individuals
who preferentially use an optimistic strategy, characterized by high
expectations and little reflection prior to a task (Cantor, Norem,
Niedenthal, Langston, & Brower, 1987). Sixth, the Reflective
Pondering subscale from the RSQ is significantly positively cor-
related with self-rated creative interests and objectively measured
creative fluency, originality, and elaboration (Verhaeghen, Joor-
mann, & Khan, 2005). Unfortunately, Brooding was not assessed,
so it is not known whether the relationship between RT and
creativity is unique to Reflective Pondering or not.
Prospective Longitudinal Studies
After controlling for trait anxiety, worry prospectively predicts
better academic performance during the 1st year of law school
(Siddique et al., 2006). Upward counterfactuals have also been
found to produce useful intentions for future behavior and to
predict better subsequent performance on anagram tasks and aca-
demic courses (Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese, 1994; Spellman &
Mandel, 1999).
Experimental Studies
Effect of RT moderated by thought content and intrapersonal
context. On a laboratory arithmetic task, during a lab-based
social interaction, or when pursuing their personal goals during an
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formed better (e.g., more arithmetic solutions, talking for longer,
more positive ratings by other participant in conversation) and
experienced less negative affect and more positive self-relevant
thoughts when manipulated to repetitively focus on possible neg-
ative outcomes compared with when manipulated to use no reflec-
tion or to focus on positive outcomes (Norem & Illingworth, 1993;
Showers, 1992). In contrast, there was little effect on performance
of manipulating reflection in optimists. Similarly, defensive pes-
simists performed best on a dart-throwing task when they imag-
ined what could go wrong as well as ways to correct these
problems and performed significantly worse when they engaged in
relaxation imagery or imagined a flawless performance (Spencer
& Norem, 1996). Thus RT on negative outcomes was constructive
for defensive pessimists but not for optimists.
Effect of RT moderated by concrete versus abstract processing
during RT. There is evidence that the focus of attention during
repetitive mental simulations influences the effectiveness of plan-
ning and self-regulation (Taylor et al., 1998; Taylor & Schneider,
1989). For example, students who repeatedly imagined the process
of how to take steps toward obtaining a high exam grade studied
more and obtained better grades than did students who repeatedly
imagined the outcome of obtaining a high grade or students who
simply monitored their studying with no mental simulation (Pham
& Taylor, 1999; Taylor et al., 1998). This effect of process
simulation versus outcome simulation on exam performance was
mediated by a reduction in anxiety and by increases in planning.
Similarly, repeated imagining of an ongoing stressful event, how it
happened, and its associated emotions produced more positive
affect and greater report of active coping after 1 week than did
imagining having resolved the situation or not imagining the event
at all (Rivkin & Taylor, 1999). Likewise, process simulations help
to reduce the planning fallacy, in which participants tend to un-
derestimate the time taken to complete tasks (Taylor et al., 1998).
Similarly, prompting RT focused on causal attributions and ab-
stract evaluations (using a set of questions such as “Why did this
problem happen?”) impaired social problem solving in a recovered
depressed group, who performed as well as never-depressed par-
ticipants in a no-prompt control condition, whereas prompting RT
focused on the concrete process of how to proceed (using a set of
questions such as “How are you deciding what to do next?”)
ameliorated the problem-solving deficit normally found in a group
of currently depressed patients (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002).
Again, RT focused on planning, induced by working through a list
of the concrete (who, what) steps necessary to plan a charity
fundraiser, resulted in less dysphoric mood, better concentration,
and more efficient performance on a subsequent reading task than
did the standard rumination manipulation in dysphoric participants
(Lyubomirsky et al., 2003, Study 1).
RT Predicts Recovery From Depression
Prospective Longitudinal Studies
Main effect of RT. RT prospectively predicts reduced levels of
depression, whether in (a) currently depressed patients receiving
pharmacotherapy (Yamada, Nagayama, Tsutiyama, Kitamura, &
Furukawa, 2003, RT  rating of extent “absorbed in thought about
the dysphoric mood itself, its cause, and possible results when
feeling down or depressed”), (b) a community sample (Treynor et
al., 2003, Reflective Pondering on RSQ), and (c) 1st year law
students (Feldman & Hayes, 2005; Plan Rehearsal).
Effect of RT moderated by intrapersonal context. Depressive
rumination interacted with self-esteem and dysfunctional attitudes
in predicting response to a group psychoeducational treatment for
patients with major or minor depression (Ciesla & Roberts, 2002).
In participants with low self-esteem or high dysfunctional atti-
tudes, increased trait rumination was associated with worse treat-
ment outcomes, whereas for participants with moderate levels of
self-esteem or low levels of dysfunctional attitudes, increased trait
rumination predicted lower levels of depression symptoms post-
treatment, even when controlling for symptoms pre-treatment.
Experimental Studies
Effect of RT moderated by concrete versus abstract processing
during RT. There is evidence from experimental studies suggest-
ing that RT can have constructive consequences on aspects of
cognition implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression. A
series of studies have adapted the standardized rumination induc-
tion (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Importantly, all variants
retain the key elements of the original rumination manipulation,
namely, repetitive focus on self, symptoms, and mood, but with
instructions to adopt different styles of processing when focusing
on the self. Thus, in depressed patients, a rumination induction
encouraging more concrete, experiential processing, in which par-
ticipants were instructed to “focus attention on the experience of”
feelings, mood, and symptoms, was compared with a rumination
induction encouraging more abstract and evaluative processing, in
which participants were instructed to “think about the causes,
meanings, and consequences” of feelings, mood, and symptoms
(Watkins & Teasdale, 2004, p. 3; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001).
Compared with abstract, evaluative rumination, experiential rumi-
nation reduced negative global self-judgments such as “I am
worthless” (Rimes & Watkins, 2005), improved social problem
solving (Watkins & Moulds, 2005a), and increased specificity of
autobiographical memory recall (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001,
2004). These cognitive processes are implicated in the onset and
maintenance of depression (Williams et al., 2007). These findings
suggest that RT focused on the direct experience of moods and
feelings reduces patterns of cognitive processing implicated in
increased vulnerability for depression relative to RT focused on
the causes, meanings, and consequences of moods and feelings. It
is important to note that both variants of rumination involved focus
on negative content: Both repetitively focused attention on the
feelings and symptoms of patients with current depression.
1
1 Experiential rumination has some overlap with mindfulness medita-
tion, conceptualized as “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose,
in the present moment, non-judgementally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4).
However, it differs from mindfulness in that it does not involve a focus on
acceptance, compassion, or decentering (viewing thought and feelings as
mental events), nor an explicit grounding in body state (focus on the breath
or scanning the body). Moreover, this brief manipulation lacks the exten-
sive formal and informal practice recognized as critical in engaging fully
with the experience of mindfulness. Further, while mindfulness meditation
can involve RT, it need not necessarily do so. Thus, these studies compared
different forms of RT to each other, rather than rumination to mindfulness.
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Behaviors
There is some preliminary evidence that RT is implicated in
health-promoting behaviors. First, increased worry about physical
health predicted prospective attempts to quit smoking in smokers
over the following 8 months (Dijkstra & Brosschot, 2003). High
worry was especially associated with a quit attempt in smokers
with both high self-efficacy and beliefs that denied or rationalized
away the risks associated with smoking. However, in ex-smokers
with low self-efficacy and high denial beliefs, worry predicted a
relapse back into smoking. Second, in a meta-analysis of 12
prospective studies that measured worry about breast cancer at
baseline and subsequent breast self-examination or utilization of
mammography, a small but reliable positive association was found
between worry about breast cancer and screening behavior, with
increased worry associated with greater probability of undertaking
screening (Hay, McCaul, & Magnan, 2006).
Properties of Constructive and Unconstructive RT
Reviewing the extant literature, it therefore appears that RT can
be both helpful and unhelpful. It is important to acknowledge that
sometimes RT has predominantly either constructive or uncon-
structive outcomes but that at other times RT may simultaneously
have both constructive and unconstructive outcomes; for example,
posttraumatic growth can occur alongside increased distress (Te-
deschi & Calhoun, 2004). What then determines whether RT has
constructive consequences and/or unconstructive consequences?
Examining the literature reviewed, a number of properties emerge
that potentially account for the distinct consequences of RT. These
properties reflect both structural aspects of RT, such as the valence
of thought content during RT, and process aspects, such as the
level of construal (concrete vs. abstract processing) adopted during
RT.
2
Valence
Unsurprisingly, valence is important in determining the conse-
quences of RT, both in terms of thought content (positive vs.
negative) and the cognitive–affective systems of the individual
engaged in RT (e.g., positive vs. negative mood; optimism vs.
pessimism). For example, RT about the acceptance of an article
that has had much work invested in it will have a very different and
more positive affective quality than RT about the same article if it
was rejected.
There is considerable evidence that the valence of thought
content is a major factor in determining whether RT is helpful or
unhelpful. First, Segerstrom et al.’s (2003) structural analysis of
RT identified the valence of thought content as an important
dimension within RT, with more negative content associated with
worse overall mental health, more anxiety, and more physical
symptoms. Second, Martin and Tesser (1996) identified that ru-
mination contains several subclasses or modes, including RT about
positive content or about negative content. Third, in a large meta-
analysis of the self-focus literature, attention to negative aspects of
the self was strongly related to increased levels of negative affect,
whereas attention to positive aspects of the self was related to
lower levels of negative affect (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Moreover,
depressive rumination was more strongly related to negative affect
than was nonruminative self-focus. Thus, RT focused on negative
aspects of the self would have more negative consequences than
RT focused on positive aspects of the self. Fourth, depressive
rumination, the form of RT most convincingly implicated in caus-
ing unconstructive consequences, is conceptualized in terms of
response to negative mood, and indexed by a measure (RSQ) that
explicitly focuses on negative content, with items characterized by
thinking about feelings and symptoms when feeling sad, down,
and depressed.
Fifth, the result that “finding benefit” during RT has more
constructive consequences (e.g., J. E. Bower et al., 1998) is con-
sistent with the valence of thought content influencing outcomes:
Finding benefit involves a focus on positive content when repeti-
tively thinking about the difficult or traumatic event. Consistent
with this, the measure of RT used in the posttraumatic growth
literature includes items that focus on positive gains (e.g., “I try to
think of some good things that happened to me after the flooding”;
Calhoun et al., 2000; Cryder et al., 2006). Sixth, the more patho-
logical consequences found for Brooding could be a result of its
particularly negative thought content, focused on self-evaluative
analysis and self-critical judgment (Treynor et al., 2003). A num-
ber of commentators have suggested that brooding is characterized
by self-evaluative, self-critical, and self-judgmental analysis, con-
sistent with more negative valence (Gortner, Rude, & Pennebaker,
2006; Joormann et al., 2006; Mathews, 2006; Treynor et al., 2003;
Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). Seventh,
when the items of the RSQ were altered to de-emphasize evalua-
tive, self-critical judgments, this Non-Judging Reflection scale was
uncorrelated with depression symptoms, unlike the standard Re-
flection scale which was significantly correlated with depression.
Thus, changing the negative judgmental quality of these items
reduced their relationship to depression (Rude, Maestas, & Neff,
2007). Eighth, while rumination about negative content predicted
depression in an 8-month longitudinal study, rumination about
depression was no longer a significant predictor of depression after
controlling for negative rumination (Ito et al., 2006). Thus, the
effects of rumination appear to depend on whether it is focused on
negative or non-negative content.
Ninth, the consequences of problem solving are known to de-
pend on the valence of the problem orientation adopted. A positive
orientation encompassing confidence in one’s ability to solve the
problem is associated with better outcomes than is a negative
orientation characterized by reduced self-confidence, reduced op-
timism, and more extreme views of the severity and intractability
of the problem (Belzer, D’Zurilla, & Maydeu-Olivares, 2002;
D’Zurilla, Chang, Nottingham, & Faccini, 1998; D’Zurilla &
Nezu, 1990, 1999; Elliott, Sherwin, Harkins, & Marmarosh, 1995;
Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1996; Shewchuk, Johnson, & El-
liott, 2000). Thus, the valence of thought content during RT
appears to be a key determinant of whether RT has constructive or
unconstructive consequences.
One mechanism by which valence may moderate the conse-
quences of RT is by determining the direction of action for the
magnifying effects of RT on mood and cognition. It has been
2 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this distinc-
tion between structural versus process aspects of RT.
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amplifies the reciprocal relationships between existing cognition
and mood (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). It is
argued that repetitive focus on affect and cognition serves to make
them more salient and, to further elaborate, to consolidate and
strengthen them. Consistent with this RT amplification hypothesis,
(a) a considerable body of research has indicated that self-focus
amplifies the effect of negative mood on thinking (Ingram, 1990;
Ingram & Smith, 1984; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987) and of
negative thoughts on mood (Mor & Winquist, 2002); (b) depres-
sive rumination is more strongly related to negative affect than is
nonruminative self-focus, indicating additional effects of RT (Mor
& Winquist, 2002); (c) compared with distraction, rumination
exacerbates pre-existing anxious mood (Blagden & Craske, 1996),
pre-existing anger (Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), and in-
creases anger in response to a provocation (Bushman, 2002; Bush-
man, Bonacci, Pedersen, Vasquez, & Miller, 2005). Thus, for
negatively valenced cognitions, RT would amplify the negative
consequences of these negative cognitions and exacerbate existing
negative mood, resulting in more unconstructive outcomes.
With this amplification hypothesis in mind, it is worth noting
that, while in the majority of cases more negative valence during
RT will be associated with more unconstructive consequences,
positive valence during RT could possibly lead to unconstructive
consequences in individuals vulnerable to hypomania and mania.
Recent theories of bipolar disorder have hypothesized that re-
peated dwelling on positive affect could amplify positive mood
and associated behavioral activation, fuelling the spiral of mood
and cognition up into hypomania (S. L. Johnson et al., in press).
Consistent with this hypothesis, compared with control partici-
pants with no history of mood disorders and individuals with major
depression, individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder endorsed
elevated emotion-focused rumination in response to positive af-
fect. Moreover, positive rumination was associated with hypo-
manic symptoms (S. L. Johnson et al., in press). Although prelim-
inary, these findings suggest a link between excessive positive
rumination and bipolar disorder: Future research will need to
examine its causal relationship with mania symptoms.
Intrapersonal and Situational Context in Which RT
Occurs: Valence and Ability
The context in which repetitive thinking occurs is also an
important determinant of the consequences of RT. Key elements of
context are (a) the prevailing valence of the cognitive–affective
system of the individual engaged in RT, in terms of mood state,
self-beliefs, and dispositional traits; and (b) the situation and
environment in which RT occurs. Both contexts can range from
negatively valenced (e.g., intrapersonal: dysphoric mood, negative
expectations, low self-esteem; situational: stressful, traumatic
events) to positively valenced (intrapersonal: positive mood, pos-
itive expectations, high self-esteem; situational: successful, re-
warding events) and both will often determine the valence of
thought content during RT. For example, when an individual has
low self-esteem or is in a dysphoric mood, negative thoughts,
memories and expectations become more easily accessible and
available, as illustrated by the phenomenon of mood-congruent
memory (G. H. Bower, 1981; Teasdale, 1983, 1988). Similarly, a
negative, stressful environment will activate negative thoughts and
increase the likelihood of negative mood. Thus, by extension, in
the context of a negative valenced intrapersonal or situational
context, RT about this negative context (which is itself negatively
valenced) would further amplify the effect of that context on mood
and cognition.
There is good evidence that the prevailing valence of an indi-
viduals’ cognitive–affective system determines whether RT is
helpful or unhelpful. First, there is extensive evidence that dys-
phoric mood and/or depressed symptoms is a setting condition for
depressive rumination to produce unconstructive consequences:
(a) The experimental literature repeatedly has found that there is
no maladaptive effect on mood and cognition of manipulating
rumination compared with distraction in individuals who are not
already in a dysphoric mood (e.g., see the review by Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2004b); (b) the effects of ruminative style on delay in
presenting symptoms of breast cancer to a healthcare professional
was moderated in part by the experience of positive mood at the
time of symptom discovery (Lyubomirsky et al., 2006); (c) rumi-
nation exacerbated the predictive effects of baseline depression on
depression 6 months later but did not predict prospective depres-
sion in the absence of depression (Roelofs et al., 2006). Second, in
a similar way, there is evidence that the consequences of worry are
moderated by the levels of trait anxiety: Worry is associated with
more active coping and greater information seeking (Davey et al.,
1992) and predicts better prospective performance (Siddique et al.,
2006) once levels of associated trait anxiety are held constant,
suggesting that worry may be more constructive when levels of
anxiety are low but becomes more problematic as trait anxiety
increases. Trait anxiety is associated with poor problem-solving
confidence (Davey et al., 1992), which in turn is implicated in the
content of worrying becoming more negative and more cata-
strophic, resulting in less constructive consequences (Davey, Jubb,
& Cameron, 1996). Davey et al. (1992, p. 145) hypothesized that
“pathological worrying is generated by a problem-focused cogni-
tive style being thwarted by a lack of confidence in the solutions
being generated.” Thus, an intrapersonal context characterized by
ongoing negative affect, whether depressed mood or trait anxiety,
will lead to more negative content during RT, and, thereby, more
unconstructive consequences.
Third, a number of studies find that the ability of RT to predict
depression is moderated by the degree of negative self-related
beliefs, with dysfunctional attitudes and self-esteem moderating
the extent to which rumination prospectively predicts (a) the onset
of depressive episodes (Robinson & Alloy, 2003) and (b) worse
treatment outcome (Ciesla & Roberts, 2002). Likewise, the effects
of experimentally manipulating rumination were moderated by the
negative self-related beliefs held by individuals (Ciesla & Roberts,
2007). Similarly, the effects of worry on smoking behavior are
moderated by levels of self-efficacy (Dijkstra & Brosschot, 2003).
Thus, there is good evidence to suggest that negative representa-
tions of the self and maladaptive beliefs about what is required to
be a worthwhile person moderate whether RT is constructive or
unconstructive. In the absence of dysphoric mood or negative
self-beliefs, RT focused on the self need not be negative; however,
in the presence of negative mood or negative self-beliefs, RT
focused on the self is likely to involve negative content. As
suggested by Ciesla and Roberts (2002, p. 447) “the process of
turning’s one attention inward may be particularly caustic if one’s
186 WATKINSthoughts are dominated by self-deprecating and perfectionistic
cognitions.”
Similarly, there is good evidence that situational context can
influence the effects of RT. First, Morrison and O’Connor (2005)
found that depressive rumination interacted with reported stress to
predict social dysfunction 6 months later. Second, trait rumination
was predictive of depression at 6-week follow-up only among
initially mildly depressed undergraduates who had both low self-
esteem and a high level of stressful life events (Ciesla & Roberts,
2007). Third, for individuals with higher levels of social anxiety,
but not for individuals with low levels of social anxiety, post-event
rumination was associated with increases in negative affect fol-
lowing personal disclosure but was associated with decreases in
negative affect following small talk (Kashdan & Roberts, 2007).
Another aspect of context that influences the consequences of
RT is an individual’s ability and expertise. Greater competence,
ability, practice, and expertise in the domain of concern are hy-
pothesized to produce more constructive outcomes during RT.
First, the defensive pessimism literature has found that RT is
associated with constructive outcomes when RT is congruent with
an individuals’ preferred strategy, such that defensive pessimists
find RT focused on negative outcomes an adaptive strategy but
optimists do not. Moreover, studies of defensive pessimism have
explicitly selected participants on the basis of a history of success
in the studied domain, whether academia or social interactions
(e.g., grade point averages  3.0 and reporting generally perform-
ing well in the past, Norem & Cantor, 1986a, 1986b), such that, by
definition, all defensive pessimists have been successful in the
domain under study. Thus, the benefit of RT for defensive pessi-
mists occurs within the context of a reasonably high level of
experience and ability. Second, in a sample of financial sector
managers, worry is correlated with better workplace performance
for more able individuals, but worry is correlated with worse
workplace performance for less able individuals, indicating the
value of ability in moderating the role of RT (Perkins & Corr,
2005). Third, the more constructive consequences of RT for indi-
viduals with high self-esteem and high self-efficacy, may, in part,
reflect greater objective ability as well as more positive subjective
perceptions of the self. Fourth, RT about the traits necessary to be
a good tennis player was negatively correlated with the quality of
play in inexperienced players but not in experienced players,
suggesting that RT has less unconstructive consequences for those
with more expertise in the relevant domain (Wicklund & Braun,
1987). Thus, there is some evidence that personal ability and
expertise may influence the consequences of RT.
Level of Construal Adopted During RT
While valence is a major factor in determining the consequences
of RT, it cannot explain all observed findings. In particular, RT
focused on negative content has been found to have constructive
consequences in studies of depressive rumination (Rimes &
Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins & Teasdale,
2001; 2004) and of defensive pessimism (Cantor & Norem, 1989;
Norem & Cantor, 1986a, 1986b; Norem & Chang, 2002; Spencer
& Norem, 1996). Moreover, simply focusing on positive outcomes
in and of itself is not necessarily the most adaptive form of RT, as
revealed by the comparison of process versus outcome simulations
(Pham & Taylor, 1999; Rivkin & Taylor, 1999; Taylor et al., 1998;
Taylor & Schneider, 1989). It is hypothesized that another prop-
erty that can account for whether RT has constructive or uncon-
structive consequences is the level of construal during RT. Re-
search on mental representation in the cognitive and social–
cognitive literatures makes a distinction between higher level,
abstract construals versus lower level, concrete construals (e.g.,
Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004;
Freitas, Salovey, & Liberman, 2001; Liberman, Sagristano, &
Trope, 2002; Markman & McMullen, 2003; Mischel & Shoda,
1995; Trope, 1989; Trope & Liberman, 2003). High-level constru-
als are abstract, general, superordinate, and decontextualized men-
tal representations that convey the essential gist and meaning of
events and actions, whereas low-level construals are more concrete
mental representations that include subordinate, contextual, spe-
cific, and incidental details of events and actions.
3 High-level
abstract construals are focused on the desirability and importance
of outcomes, whereas low-level concrete construals are focused on
the feasibility and planning of outcomes. Thus, different levels of
construal can be adopted when perceiving one’s own and other’s
behavior: Inferences of global traits that are invariant across dif-
ferent situations (e.g., laziness) constitute relatively high-level,
abstract construals of behavior, whereas inferences of situation-
specific states (e.g., tiredness), constitute relatively low-level con-
crete construals of behavior (Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman,
2003). Similarly, actions, events, and goals can be represented in
terms of high-level or low-level construals: Representations of the
abstract “why” aspects of an action and of the ends consequential
to an action constitute relatively high-level construals, whereas
representations of the specific “how” details of the action and of
the means to the end constitute relatively low-level construals
(Freitas et al., 2004; Trope & Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Weg-
ner, 1987).
Across this review, there is evidence that RT characterized by
high-level, more abstract construals has more unconstructive con-
sequences relative to RT characterized by low-level, more concrete
construals, at least when RT is focused on negatively valenced
content (to date, the majority of studies relevant to level of con-
strual in RT have involved negatively valenced RT). First, within
experimental studies that manipulate RT, one experimental condi-
tion is often characterized by lower level construals that focus on
contextual details and the means to desired ends (e.g., experiential
rumination, Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a;
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004; simulation of the process of how
to achieve a goal, Taylor et al., 1998; mindsets involving imagin-
ing how things unfold or how to proceed, Moberly & Watkins,
2006; Watkins, 2004a; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002), whereas the
3 It is important to note that the distinction between abstract and concrete
levels of representation used here differs from accounts in which concrete
levels of representation are associated with “hot,” emotionally arousing
representations, whereas abstract levels of representation are associated
with “cool,” less arousing representations (Ayduk, Mischel, & Downey,
2002; and Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005, who reported that distanced,
non-emotionally immersed processing can be adaptive when focused on
anger; for a theoretical account, see Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). The
level-of-construal and level-of-goal-hierarchy accounts discussed here do
not make links between level of processing and emotional arousal, rather
degree of emotional arousal/distance is conceptualized as a separate di-
mension.
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focus on meanings and implications (e.g., analytical rumination,
Ehring et al., 2007; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Moulds,
2005a; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004; outcome simulation,
Taylor et al., 1998; mindsets involving thinking about causes,
meanings, consequences, Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins,
2004a; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). For example, because repre-
sentations of desired ends and outcomes sought by an action
constitute relatively high-level construals, whereas representations
of the specific “how” details of the action and of the means to the
end constitute relatively low-level construals, process simulations
involve relatively lower level construals than do outcome simula-
tions. Critically, the manipulations of RT involving lower level
construals produce more constructive consequences than the ma-
nipulations of RT involving higher level construals, including
better social problem solving, more specific autobiographical
memory, less global negative self-judgments (Rimes & Watkins,
2005; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a;
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004), improved self-regulation and
academic performance (Pham & Taylor, 1999; Rivkin & Taylor,
1999; Taylor et al., 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989), better
emotional recovery from prior failure (Watkins, 2004a), and up-
setting images (Ehring et al., 2007), and reduced emotional vul-
nerability to subsequent failure (Moberly & Watkins, 2006). Im-
portantly, these manipulations of RT are often matched for degree
of negative thought content, such that the distinct functional con-
sequences cannot be due to differences in valence of thought
content.
Second, the form of anticipatory RT within the MMAP focused
on low-level construals (Plan Rehearsal) was negatively correlated
with depression both concurrently and prospectively, whereas the
form of anticipatory RT focused on higher level construals (Prob-
lem Analysis) was associated with increased anxiety (Feldman &
Hayes, 2005). Third, the current construal-level analysis subsumes
the reduced concreteness theory of worry, which proposes that
worry is predominantly experienced in a more abstract–verbal
form rather than in a more concrete–visual imagery form and that
this reduced concreteness leads to negative consequences for prob-
lem solving and affect regulation (Borkovec et al., 1998; Stober,
1998; Stober & Borkovec, 2002; Stober, Tepperwien, & Staak,
2000). Consistent with this theory, worry seems to be predomi-
nantly experienced in a verbal form rather than in images (Bork-
ovec & Inz, 1990; Borkovec et al., 1993, 1998; Borkovec et al.,
1983; Freeston, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1996; McLaughlin et al.,
2007). Moreover, elaborations of problems about which partici-
pants worry are independently and blindly rated as more abstract
and less concrete than those of problems about which participants
do not worry (Borkovec et al., 1998; Sto ¨ber, 1998; Sto ¨ber &
Borkovec, 2002). Within reduced concreteness theory, concrete
thought is defined as “distinct, situationally specific, unequivocal,
clear, singular” and abstract thought as “indistinct, cross-
situational, equivocal, unclear, aggregated” (Sto ¨ber & Borkovec,
2002, p. 92), which fits within the existing conceptualization of
low-level versus high-level construals. Furthermore, reduced con-
creteness has been found during RT in currently depressed patients
(Cribb, Moulds, & Carter, 2006; Watkins & Moulds, 2007) and
during rumination in undergraduates (McLaughlin et al., 2007),
indicating that this analysis applies to other forms of RT than
worry.
Fourth, there is indirect evidence that level of construal could
contribute to the beneficial effects of defensive pessimism. Defen-
sive pessimists appear to have a strategy of viewing negative
futures as temporally close, and this strategy predicts improved
task performance, through the mediator of increased preparation
(Sanna, Chang, Carter, & Small, 2006). Temporal construal theory
proposes that thinking about distant futures involves more high-
level construals, whereas thinking about close futures involves
more low-level construals (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Lower level
construals would in turn lead to more specific preparation for an
upcoming task.
One mechanism by which the level of construal may influence
the consequences of RT is by influencing the efficacy of problem
solving. Both the reduced concreteness theory (Sto ¨ber & Bork-
ovec, 2002) and the action identification theory (Vallacher &
Wegner, 1987) hypothesize that processing at a lower level of
construal provides more elaborated and contextual detail about the
specific means, alternatives, and actions by which to best proceed
when faced with difficult, novel, or complex situations. Consistent
with this hypothesis, lower level construals are associated with
better problem solving (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins &
Moulds, 2005a).
A second mechanism by which level of construal may influence
the consequences of RT is through its effects on self-regulation.
Increased focus on a concrete level of construal is hypothesized to
facilitate self-regulation in situations where elevated self-focused
attention and deliberate efforts to control behavior may be coun-
terproductive, such as choking under pressure and test anxiety
(Leary, Adams, & Tate, 2006). Since elevated self-focused atten-
tion and increased efforts at self-regulation are often characteristic
of RT, in particular of rumination and worry, RT may become
more constructive as thinking becomes more concrete. Leary et al.
(2006) argued that abstract construals about the evaluative or
interpersonal implications of one’s behavior interrupt the smooth
performance of behaviors, whereas, in contrast, more concrete
construals benefit self-regulation by (a) focusing attention on the
immediate demands of the present situation, (b) reducing anxiety,
and (c) requiring less effort and thus using up fewer self-regulatory
resources. For example, a basketball player would perform better
when focusing on how to make the shot rather than when thinking
about the implications of missing. Consistent with this analysis,
the use of concrete construals frees up cognitive resources, reduces
anxiety, and/or improves task performance, whether in the form of
implementation intentions specifying how and when an action will
be performed (“If I encounter situation X, then I’ll perform be-
havior Y”) or via focusing on the sound of one’s voice (vs. trying
to be persuasive) when giving a speech, especially when the task
is considered difficult or occurs under conditions of high cognitive
load (Brandstatter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 2001; Gollwitzer,
1999; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Vallacher, Wegner, & Somoza,
1989; Webb & Sheeran, 2003).
A third mechanism by which the level of construal may influ-
ence the consequences of RT is by influencing the degree of
generalization in response to emotional events. Processing char-
acterized by higher level construals produces mental representa-
tions that generalize across situations and that do not incorporate
specific contextual details. Such generalizations can be beneficial
by allowing gainful and useful inferences across different situa-
tions beyond available data and by enabling transfer of learning
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& Wegner, 1987). However, in negative situations, more abstract
construals could facilitate negative overgeneralizations where a
single failure is explained in terms of a global personal inadequacy
(e.g., “I am worthless”) rather than in terms of situation-specific
difficulties (Hamilton, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Cather, 1993).
Such negative generalizations are implicated in the development of
depression (Beck, 1976; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979;
Carver, 1998; Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Carver, Lavoie, Kuhl, &
Ganellen, 1988). Thus, when faced with negative information,
more concrete construals are hypothesized to be more adaptive by
reducing negative overgeneralizations. Consistent with this hy-
pothesis, more concrete thinking is found to facilitate the interpre-
tation of the causes of negative events as unstable and controllable
(Showers, 1988); voluntarily recalling an emotional event in spe-
cific detail produces less emotional response than recalling it at a
more general level (Philippot, Baeyens, & Douilliez, 2006; Phil-
ippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, 2003); and practice at recalling spe-
cific, contextualized autobiographical memories reduces the neg-
ative experience to a subsequent stressful task relative to practice
at recalling general, decontextualized memories (Raes, Hermans,
Williams, & Eelen, 2006).
Evaluating Models of RT
What theory best accounts for the data and properties described
above? A first step toward answering this question is to consider
the existing theoretical models of RT and to evaluate how well
they account for the different consequences and properties re-
viewed. Three principal approaches can be identified: the response
styles approach (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2004b), the cognitive
processing approach (Greenberg, 1995; Horowitz, 1985; Tedeschi
& Calhoun, 2004), and the discrepancy-focused control theory
approach (Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996).
4
RST of Rumination
Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991, 2000, 2004b) seminal RST hypoth-
esizes that rumination is a trait-like style of responding to de-
pressed mood that has been found to be consistent across situations
and repeated testing (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993) and appears to
be a stable individual difference characteristic (Nolen-Hoeksema
& Davis, 1999). The ruminative response style is hypothesized to
be learnt in childhood, either because it was modeled by parents
who themselves had a passive coping style (Nolen-Hoeksema,
1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Mumme, Wolfson, & Guskin, 1995) or
because the child failed to learn more active coping strategies for
negative affect as a consequence of overcritical, intrusive, and
overcontrolling parents (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1995), or early
physical/sexual abuse. Retrospective studies have found that ele-
vated rumination is associated with self-report of overcontrolling
parents (Spasojevic & Alloy, 2002) and reports of physical and
sexual abuse (Conway, Mendelson, Giannopoulos, Csank, &
Holm, 2004), although, like all retrospective studies, current mood,
memory biases, and demand biases could influence the report of
past events, raising questions as to veridicality.
The RST provides a detailed analysis of the mechanisms by
which RT leads to unconstructive outcomes but was conceived
with less explanatory power with regard to explaining how RT can
be constructive. The RST emphasizes the importance of repeated
and passive focus on depressed symptoms in determining the
negative effects of rumination (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2004b). The RST pro-
poses that ruminative self-focus in response to a depressed mood
amplifies a vicious cycle between depressed mood and negative,
pessimistic thinking, thereby exacerbating negative mood and neg-
ative thinking and impairing problem solving. Research has dem-
onstrated that depressed mood has negative effects on thinking by
selectively priming mood-relevant information and activating
mood-congruent memories, beliefs, and expectations (G. H.
Bower, 1981; Teasdale, 1983). In turn, these negative cognitions
can then further maintain or exacerbate negative mood, producing
a vicious cycle between depressed mood and negative thinking.
RST proposes that focus on symptoms further fuels this vicious
cycle, consistent with a considerable body of research indicating
that self-focus can act to amplify the effect of negative mood on
thinking (Ingram, 1990; Ingram & Smith, 1984; Pyszczynski &
Greenberg, 1987). As such, RST provides a good account of how
structural factors such as negatively valenced thought content,
current dysphoric mood, or negative self-beliefs would result in
RT with unconstructive consequences.
However, a major limitation of the RST is that it was not
designed to explain RT with constructive outcomes, and, as such,
does not directly instantiate how RT could have positive conse-
quences. Nonetheless, by logical extension, one can hypothesize
that the amplifying effects of RT could also work for positive
valence, such that RT focused on positive thought content would
amplify a self-reinforcing cycle between positive mood and more
optimistic thinking, consistent with the observed influence of
thought valence on the consequences of RT. However, even with
this extension to the RST, it cannot account for the evidence that
RT focused on negative content can still have constructive conse-
quences, as found in experimental manipulations of depressive
rumination, defensive pessimism, or cognitive processing of dis-
tressing events. For example, several experimental studies found
that RT focused on depressive symptoms has constructive conse-
quences (Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001;
2004), inconsistent with the RST. Nor can the RST account for
constructive consequences of RT that are not tied to increases in
positive affect, since the constructive effects of RT would depend
on amplifying the reciprocal cycle between positive mood and
optimistic cognition. For example, improvements in problem solv-
ing following RT that are not associated with improvements in
mood (e.g., Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002)
cannot be explained by RST. Furthermore, RST cannot account for
the influence of process aspects of RT on its consequences, in
particular, the level of construal adopted during RT. A further
limitation of RST is that it exclusively focuses on RT in response
4 Several theories of cognition and emotion share with the control theory
account an emphasis on (a) self-related discrepancies driving RT and (b)
different levels of processing and mental representation, notably the Self-
Regulatory Executive Function model (SREF; Papageorgiou & Wells,
2003; Wells & Matthews, 1994) and the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems
theory (ICS; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). As many of the predictions and
principles of these models can be subsumed within the broader control
theory framework and are not exclusive to each particular theory, in the
interests of conciseness, these theories are not further elaborated here.
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RT, RT can also be triggered by and focused on other negative
mood states, unresolved goals, and life events (Lavallee & Camp-
bell, 1995; Millar, Tesser, & Millar, 1988; Robinson & Alloy,
2003), as well as on positive content (Martin & Tesser, 1996).
Cognitive Processing Theories
RT focused on coming to terms with past upsetting events is a
key element of the cognitive processing literature. Stressful and
traumatic events often contain novel information or give rise to
appraisals that are not consistent with prior mental structures such
as the beliefs and assumptions that people hold about themselves
and the world (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). For example, a violent
assault and the increased sense of vulnerability it produces would
clash with prior beliefs such as “the world is basically safe” and
“bad things don’t happen to good people.” Cognitive processing
accounts propose that this discrepancy between the meaning of the
negative event and pre-existing mental structures makes it difficult
to integrate this new information into current mental structures and
leads to distress. Recovery from distressing experiences is as-
sumed to require that the person work through and resolve the
incongruence between the information acquired from the distress-
ing experience and pre-existing mental structures representing the
world (Horowitz, 1986). Within cognitive processing accounts, the
discrepancy between the meaning of the event and pre-existing
mental structures is proposed to produce RT in the form of re-
peated intrusions and re-experiencing of the distressing event until
the discrepancy is resolved. Thus, cognitive processing accounts
have explained the onset and maintenance of RT. However, these
accounts have not tended to explicitly instantiate what determines
whether RT has constructive or unconstructive outcomes. Indeed,
there has been some debate as to whether the RT is a necessary and
active part of working through the upsetting event or simply an
epiphenomenon of recovery (Harber & Pennebaker, 1992; Horow-
itz, 1986; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Tait & Silver, 1989).
Nonetheless, cognitive processing approaches are consistent
with structural factors such as valence influencing the conse-
quences of RT. Recent cognitive processing accounts emphasize
that a focus on finding benefit when thinking about upsetting and
traumatic events results in better outcomes, consistent with the
valence of thought content influencing the consequences of RT. In
addition, theoretical accounts of cognitive processing suggest that
it will be easier to organize and make coherent one single event
rather than multiple events simultaneously, because multiple mem-
ories will interfere with the processing of each other, take up more
central executive resources (Foa & Kozak, 1986), and include
more disparate material that does not easily fit into the temporal
and spatial sequence necessary for the creation of a coherent story,
which is hypothesized to be essential for effective working through
of upsetting events (Foa et al., 1995; Klein & Boals, 2001; Pen-
nebaker, 1997; Pennebaker et al., 1997; Pennebaker & Seagal,
1999; Sloan & Marx, 2004; Smyth et al., 2001). Thus, because a
negative intrapersonal context increases the availability and acces-
sibility of negative concerns and negative memories (S. M. Smith
& Petty, 1995; Teasdale, 1983; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; Teas-
dale & Dent, 1987), it may make it harder to effectively process
any particular difficult event.
However, cognitive processing theories cannot account for how
the level of construal could influence the consequences of RT. A
further limitation of cognitive processing accounts is that they
have predominantly focused on RT related to traumatic and dis-
tressing events, where there is a discrepancy between the meaning
of the distressing events and existing beliefs. As such, cognitive
processing theories do not account for different consequences of
RT that are unrelated to such discrepancies in meaning and emo-
tion, for example, anticipatory RT associated with adaptive plan-
ning and preparation or the uptake of health-promoting behaviors.
Control Theory Approaches to RT
Control theory proposes that all behavior, including mental
activities, reflects a process of feedback control. Individuals per-
ceive their current state and behavior and then compare these
perceptions with salient reference values such as their goals, stan-
dards, or desired outcomes. If the comparison indicates a discrep-
ancy between actual state and reference value, such as an unre-
solved goal, behavior will be adjusted in order to bring it closer to
the reference value (Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1990; Carver &
Scheier, 1998). In particular, discrepancies between expected rates
of progress toward goals are hypothesized to influence behavior
and affect. The original control theory approach to RT emphasized
that rumination is triggered by a discrepancy in goal progress and
that these goals are organized hierarchically (Martin & Tesser,
1989, 1996). Furthermore, RT focused on the discrepancy in
attaining the unresolved goal is intended to serve the function of
facilitating progress toward the reference value. Within this ac-
count, the RT will continue either until the goal is met or until the
individual disengages from and abandons the goal (Carver &
Scheier, 1990; Klinger, 1975; Martin, Shrira, & Startup, 2004;
Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987;
Wells & Matthews, 1994). It is important to recognize that repre-
sentations of both external stimuli (e.g., a physical situation, a
concrete outcome) and internal stimuli (e.g., moods, feelings) can
act as reference values for goals, such that RT can be influenced by
discrepancies in representations of both external and internal
states.
There is accumulating evidence consistent with this goal-
discrepancy control theory approach to RT. RT about important
people and activities left behind when coming to college was
positively predicted by the extent to which these activities re-
mained interrupted at college, that is, the extent these important
goals were not attained (Millar et al., 1988). Abstract goals that are
more important and meaningful to people, such as attaining hap-
piness, and concrete goals that are linked to these important
abstract goals, such as being in a romantic relationship, produce
more RT when not attained (W. D. Mcintosh, Harlow, & Martin,
1995; W. D. McIntosh & Martin, 1992). In a diary study, negative
events that were related to personal goals produced more RT than
goal-unrelated negative events (Lavallee & Campbell, 1995).
The tendency toward RT seems to depend on the perseverance
of unresolved goal-related thoughts, as evidenced in the Zeigarnik
effect, in which recall of interrupted and uncompleted tasks is
significantly better than recall of completed tasks (Kuhl & Beck-
mann, 1985; Kuhl & Helle, 1986; Zeigarnik, 1938). There is an
extensive literature confirming that unresolved and blocked goals
increase the priming and accessibility of goal-relevant information
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Gollwitzer, 1996; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Martin & Tesser, 1989),
whereas resolved goals inhibit the priming and accessibility of
goal-relevant information, consistent with a control process ac-
count of how RT would be initiated and terminated (Forster,
Liberman, & Higgins, 2005; R. E. Johnson, Chang, & Lord, 2006).
Moreover, principles within control theory can be elaborated to
account for the reviewed findings. Critically, unlike the other
accounts, the control theory account (Martin & Tesser, 1989,
1996) explicitly hypothesized that RT can have constructive or
unconstructive consequences. Within control theory, RT produces
constructive consequences if it helps to resolve the discrepancy
between the intended goal and actual current state, whether by
aiding progress toward the goal or by helping to modify or aban-
don the goal (Klinger, 1975; Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996;
Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003). In contrast, RT
becomes unconstructive if a person experiences an inability to
progress toward reducing the discrepancy and at the same time is
unable to give up on the reference value or goal. In such a case, RT
would serve only to focus attention on the discrepancy between the
desired goal and the actual situation, making the unresolved dis-
crepancy more salient, perpetuating the unresolved issue, and
exacerbating negative affect (Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998;
Klinger, 1975; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985; Martin & Tesser, 1989,
1996; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). It is important to distin-
guish between disengaging from efforts at goal pursuit, whether
mentally or physically, and disengaging from the underlying goal:
The former combines a lack of goal progress with the ongoing
maintenance of the desired but unattained goal, further highlight-
ing the unresolved discrepancy, whereas the latter constructively
reduces the goal discrepancy.
To date, control theory accounts have focused on hypothesizing
the mechanisms underpinning the onset, frequency, and duration
of RT rather than instantiating the mechanisms that determine
whether RT is constructive or unconstructive. RT was proposed to
be beneficial if individuals “use a form of rumination that can
provide a solution for the type of problem they are facing,”
although this was not further specified other than to suggest that
applying logic to insight problems or insight to logic problems
may be unhelpful (Martin et al., 2004, p. 171). Nonetheless, there
are principles within control theory that can be elaborated to
explain how the properties identified in this review can influence
the consequences of RT.
First, control theory can account for the findings that structural
aspects of RT such as valence of thought content and intrapersonal
context influence the consequences of RT. Within control theory,
expectancies and beliefs about the self and about the outcomes of
behavior are hypothesized to play an important role in determining
how a person responds to a discrepancy between the actual state
and the desired state, by influencing persistence at goal pursuit, the
reference values by which goal progress is judged, the interpreta-
tion of feedback, and the judgment of when to abandon a goal
(Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998; Hyland, 1987). More negative
expectancies, such as doubts about ability to succeed, will lead to
attempts to disengage from goal pursuit as well as a greater
perceived discrepancy between desired state and actual state. As
noted above, disengaging from goal pursuit will leave an unre-
solved discrepancy, which, in the absence of abandoning the
unresolved goal, will cause RT to have unconstructive conse-
quences. Moreover, an individual’s beliefs and moods, particularly
those relevant to judging self-worth, will influence their goals and
reference values, such that more extreme beliefs about what is
required to achieve self-worth will result in (a) harder-to-attain
reference values, making discrepancies between the desired state
and the actual state harder to resolve and (b) harder-to-abandon
goals. For example, negative mood can cause individuals to in-
crease their standards for success, making it harder to resolve a
goal discrepancy (Cervone, Kopp, Schaumann, & Scott, 1994),
consistent with a control theory account of RT. In the context of
RT, this analysis suggests that maladaptive beliefs about what is
required to be a worthwhile person, such as high levels of dys-
functional attitudes, will lead to both harder-to-attain goals and
reluctance to abandon these goals, trapping an individual in un-
constructive RT, consistent with the observed findings (e.g., Ciesla
& Roberts, 2007).
Moreover, self-representations can influence the ability of indi-
viduals to disengage from an unresolved goal by substituting it
with positive affirmations on another aspect of self that relates to
the same superordinate goal. Affirming valued aspects of the self
reduces RT about a frustrated goal (Koole, Smeets, van Knippen-
berg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999). However, individuals with reduced
self-esteem and more dysfunctional self-beliefs have reduced self-
affirmational resources in response to difficulties (Koole et al.,
1999; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993), making it harder to dis-
engage from unconstructive RT about an interrupted or incomplete
goal and move onto more constructive RT (Di Paula & Campbell,
2002; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985; Kuhl & Helle, 1986) or to disen-
gage from unsolvable tasks (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999). Since
expectancies are examples of positive and negative thoughts, while
beliefs and mood are elements of intrapersonal context, control
theory thus accommodates the structural aspects of RT identified
earlier.
Second, and more pertinently, further elaboration of principles
within control theory accounts for the finding that process aspects
of RT such as level of construal influence the consequences of RT.
Within control theory, it is hypothesized that goals and behaviors
are hierarchically organized and can be processed at different
levels of abstraction, with more abstract, superordinate goals and
standards guiding and informing more specific, subordinate goals
and standards. Within this hierarchical organization, pursuit to-
ward abstract goals occurs by specifying reference values at the
next lower level of abstraction, all the way down to the concrete
representations required to specify the actual behaviors needed to
progress toward the goal (D. E. Broadbent, 1977; Carver &
Scheier, 1990, 1998; Emmons, 1992; Powers, 1973a, 1973b;
Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Carver and Scheier (1990) proposed
that the most abstract levels represent a global sense of idealized
self, which in turn sets the broad principles that organize goals and
behavioral standards across multiple situations (e.g., to be an
honest person), corresponding to higher level construals, whereas
the more concrete levels represent the specific actions and behav-
ioral programs necessary to implement the principles in a partic-
ular situation (e.g., telling the truth to a friend), corresponding to
lower level construals. Thus, this hierarchical organization affords
the use of high- and low-level construals, consistent with the
distinction between abstract versus concrete processing within RT.
Further, control theory hypothesizes that effective self-
regulation requires flexible and balanced coordination between the
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nate level of control adaptively varies in response to situational
and task demands. Depending on context, a level of control that is
too abstract, too concrete, or that fails to link abstract levels to
concrete levels is hypothesized to be detrimental (Carver &
Scheier, 1998, Chapter 13). Elaborating on key principles within
control theory suggests that there are a number of distinct advantages
and disadvantages for self-regulation when the level of control is
located higher or lower in the goal hierarchy, corresponding to ab-
stract versus concrete levels of construal, respectively.
Thus, one hypothesized advantage of higher level, abstract
control is increased consistency and stability of behavior toward
long-term goals across time and across different situational de-
mands because higher level control ensures that subordinate goals
and actions remain directed toward personally important higher
level goals and minimizes interference from incidental influences
(Carver & Scheier, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; 1989). In
contrast, low-level control is hypothesized to be more sensitive to
contextual and situational detail, resulting in increased impulsive-
ness and distractibility. Consistent with this hypothesis, a habitual
tendency toward more abstract construals is associated with more
persistent and stable behavior, greater self-motivation, less impul-
siveness, and fewer action errors (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), and
adopting high-level construals produces greater self-control on
experimental tasks than adopting low-level construals (Fujita,
Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006). A second hypothesized
advantage of higher level control is that it provides more flexibility
in responding to relatively low-level goals that are unattained
because processing at a higher level affords more alternative
subgoals and behaviors to resolve the goal discrepancy (Brunstein
& Gollwitzer, 1996). For example, if an individual is failing to
progress on the daily goal of writing a poem, control at the level
of an abstract superordinate goal (e.g., “to be creative”) provides
alternative goals and means to resolve this discrepancy (e.g., play
music, draw, paint) that are not available if the functionally su-
perordinate goal is just to complete a poem. Thus, this analysis
suggests that under some circumstances, for example, when con-
sidering long-term goals, RT characterized by higher level, ab-
stract construals will be constructive.
However, a logical elaboration from control theory is that higher
level abstract control will become disadvantageous under particu-
lar circumstances. First, because pursuit toward abstract goals
occurs by specifying reference values at the next lower level, down
to the actual concrete behaviors required, the aforementioned
advantages of higher level control/abstract construals will only
occur when there is sufficiently operationalized specification from
the higher levels down to lower levels of representation (see also
Carver & Scheier, 1998). When programs and sequences of goal-
related behaviors are straightforward, familiar, and practiced, an
individual will have developed extensive procedural knowledge
specifying the links between goals and behaviors across all levels,
making higher level control of self-regulation effective (Anderson,
1983; Vera & Simon, 1993). However, under circumstances of
novelty, unfamiliarity, difficulty, or stress, this specification of
reference values down through the control hierarchy can break
down, such that the advantages of controlling self-regulation at a
higher level are lost. For example, adopting a high level of control
focused on a goal such as “be punctual” would not be useful for
either a learner driver still getting used to handling a car or for an
experienced driver in hazardous, unfamiliar driving conditions
such as a snowstorm since, in both cases, there is not well-
established specification of how high-level reference values trans-
late into subgoals and concrete behavior. Instead, control of be-
havior needs to be located at low levels in the hierarchy concerned
with concrete and specific actions. Second, when the superordinate
abstract goal is ill-defined and it is difficult to specify how it might
actually be achieved, control at a higher level in the goal hierarchy
is going to be problematic. For example, a goal like “be happy”
may be too abstract and vague to provide clear guidance as to how
an individual might specify subgoals toward attaining it. Third,
processing at a more abstract level may interfere with goal disen-
gagement: The more abstract the level at which a goal is repre-
sented in the hierarchy, the more important the goal becomes to the
general sense of self, and the harder it becomes to disengage from
the goal (Martin & Tesser, 1996; W. D. McIntosh & Martin, 1992;
Millar et al., 1988). Such abstract construals will be unproblematic
when there is sufficient progress toward the relevant goal. How-
ever, when a goal is difficult or impossible to attain, processing at
too abstract a level will make it harder to relinquish the goal,
trapping the individual in the invidious state where he or she can
neither make progress toward the goal nor abandon it, leading to
persistent but unconstructive RT. This analysis therefore suggests
that under circumstances of novelty, unfamiliarity, difficulty, or
stress, RT characterized by higher level, abstract construals will be
unconstructive as it gives limited guidance as to what to do next.
The elaborated control theory therefore proposes that for more
difficult and novel tasks, where full specification through the
goal–action hierarchy is lacking, control of behavior at more
concrete, lower levels in the hierarchy is more functional. Shifting
control down to lower levels of abstraction, which corresponds to
a more concrete level of construal, is hypothesized to ensure that
goals and standards are translated into effective goal pursuit,
because processing at a more concrete level serves the functions of
determining the specific means and actions by which to best
proceed and focuses attention on the immediate environment
(Carver & Scheier, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Moreover,
lower level construals may provide more concrete indicators of
progress than might high-level construals (Emmons, 1992): It is
easier to determine if one is being successful at pursuing a lower
level goal like “keeping your desk clean” than the associated
higher level goal of “being more organized.”
5 Further, a more
concrete level of construal may make it easier to disengage from
an unattainable goal by reducing its personal importance and
self-relevance.
Thus, by logically elaborating on principles within control the-
ory, it is hypothesized that higher level, abstract construals pro-
mote effective goal progress for unproblematic, familiar, or posi-
tive situations, but that lower level, concrete construals are more
constructive for difficult or novel situations and unattainable goals.
Therefore, the elaborated control theory hypothesizes an interac-
tion between structural aspects (valence) and process aspects (level
of construal) in determining the consequences of RT. Critically,
this account explains the observed pattern of findings in which
5 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting how more
concrete levels of construal would facilitate the monitoring of goal
progress.
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negative content or in the context of negative situations (e.g.,
focusing on depressed mood, thinking about upsetting events, or
planning for stressful events like exams) results in more construc-
tive outcomes than does RT characterized by a more abstract level
of construal (e.g., Leary et al., 2006; Pham & Taylor, 1999;
Vallacher et al., 1989; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins &
Teasdale, 2001, 2004; Webb & Sheeran, 2003). However, the
corollary prediction that during RT about positive content or in the
context of positive situations abstract construals will have more
constructive outcomes than those of concrete construals has not
been extensively tested. Recent evidence consistent with this pre-
diction is the finding that people with low self-esteem induced to
think abstractly about a recent compliment from a romantic partner
report greater state self-esteem and greater security in their rela-
tionships than do people with low self-esteem induced to think
concretely about a recent compliment (Marigold, Holmes, & Ross,
2007).
A related prediction from the elaborated control theory is that by
default individuals will adopt more abstract construals but will
shift to more concrete construals when faced with difficulties (see
also Wegner & Vallacher, 1987). Consistent with this hypothesis,
individuals tend by default to use more abstract construals, focused
on the meanings, consequences, and implications of actions (Weg-
ner & Vallacher, 1987; Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji,
1986; Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps, 1984), yet
when faced with difficult, novel, or complex situations, people
often move toward more concrete levels of processing (Beckmann,
1994; Vallacher, Wegner, & Frederick, 1987; Wegner et al., 1984;
Wong & Weiner, 1981), although there are exceptions, including
the tendency toward depressive rumination in response to sad
mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) and occasions when more abstract
construals are adopted in response to failure and goal frustration
(Wicklund, 1986). Other evidence consistent with this hypothesis
is the finding that in neutral and happy moods people adopt a more
global, abstract processing style but shift into a more local, con-
crete processing style in response to sad mood (Beukeboom &
Semin, 2005, 2006; Bless et al., 1996; Gasper & Clore, 2002;
Isbell, 2004; Kurman, 2003; Storbeck & Clore, 2005). This hy-
pothesis predicts that RT will tend to be characterized by higher
level, abstract construals when goal progress is unproblematic, but
that RT will tend to be characterized by lower level, concrete
construals when goal progress is blocked. Because the elaborated
control theory hypothesizes that higher level control is the default
level of control, it also accounts for the finding that competence,
practice, and expertise influence the consequences of RT, for
example, the benefit of RT for depressive pessimists. When an
individual is more familiar and skilled within a domain, he or she
is more likely to have good specification from high levels to low
levels in the goal–action hierarchy, reducing the likelihood of
higher level control breaking down.
The Control Theory Account: An Integrative Overview
and Novel Predictions
One of the main strengths of this elaborated control theory
account is its ability to account for the findings reviewed regarding
the different consequences of RT, in particular, its ability to
accommodate both structural approaches to RT (valence, context)
and to expand on these approaches to explain process approaches
to RT (level of construal). Moreover, this control theory account of
RT is consistent with the extensive literature linking goal discrep-
ancy with RT. A further advantage of the control theory approach
is that it can integrate the other theoretical approaches to RT and
their associated findings within its conceptual framework. Control
theory can explain the findings within cognitive processing ac-
counts, since both theories propose that a key mechanism driving
RT is the attempt to reduce discrepancies, whether between current
outcome and desired goals or between current informational state
and existing mental structures (Martin & Tesser, 1989). Within
control theory, the adoption of a higher level goal such as “making
sense of events” or “reducing discrepant information” could ac-
count for the observations within the cognitive processing account,
as explicitly outlined within models of posttraumatic growth (Te-
deschi & Calhoun, 2004). Moreover, despite initial suggestions
that discrepancies were not necessary for depressive rumination to
occur (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), theoretical accounts suggest that
focus on the causes and consequences of depressed mood is likely
to involve focus on unresolved goal discrepancies (e.g., Brunstein
& Gollwitzer, 1996; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). Moreover,
recent findings within RST are consistent with the predictions of
control theory: (a) The content of experimentally induced rumina-
tion is characterized by thinking about unresolved personal prob-
lems (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999); (b) depressive rumination is
associated with meta-cognitive beliefs that rumination is useful for
understanding depression and solving problems, suggesting that
depressive rumination is adopted with the intention of resolving
goal-based or meaning-related discrepancies (Lyubomirsky &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Watkins &
Baracaia, 2001; Watkins & Moulds, 2005b); and (c) experimen-
tally induced rumination and discrepancy-focused thinking both
increase anxiety and depressed mood to an equivalent degree and
are indistinguishable in terms of flow of thought content (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2004a). Indeed, Treynoret al (2003, p. 256) interpreted
brooding as “a passive comparison of one’s current situation with
some unachieved standard,” consistent with a control theory ac-
count.
A further advantage of the control theory account is that it can
account for the adoption of the different structural and process
aspects of RT. For example, as noted earlier, there is evidence that
in response to difficulties, individuals sometimes adopt a more
concrete level of construal (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) but some-
times adopt more abstract construals (Wicklund, 1986), as exem-
plified by the abstract RT found during depressive rumination/
brooding. Thus, any theory of RT needs to explain the mechanisms
underpinning whether RT involves (a) negative or positive thought
content and (b) an abstract or concrete level of construal. Structural
factors, such as valence, are relatively straightforward to explain
across all models of RT: Thought valence will be determined by
the nature of the event and the context in which RT occurs as well
as by individual beliefs, expectancies, and learning history. In
addition, within control theory, goal progress at a rate faster than
anticipated produces positive mood and cognition, whereas goal
progress slower than anticipated produces negative valence
(Carver & Scheier, 1990).
The elaborated control theory account hypothesizes that the
level of construal is principally determined by adaptive regulation
of level of construal in response to situational demands, such that
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ties, but that various situational, motivational, and cognitive fac-
tors can interfere with this regulatory process. First, the extent to
which goal progress is blocked is hypothesized to influence the
level of construal adopted (Martin & Tesser, 1996): When goal
progress is moderately thwarted it is still adaptive to shift to lower
level construals (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), whereas more severe
blockage, particularly for highly self-relevant goals, leads to
higher level construals (Wicklund, 1986), as individuals re-orient
to their higher order concerns. Second, self-related beliefs are
hypothesized to influence the preference toward more abstract or
more concrete levels of construal. For example, meta-cognitive
beliefs that it is important to understand and make sense of feelings
and problems would encourage the use of higher level construals.
Likewise, low, unstable or contingent self-esteem leads to attempts
to pursue self-esteem by trying to validate abilities and qualities
(Crocker & Knight, 2005; Crocker & Park, 2004; Crocker &
Wolfe, 2001), which typically involves evaluating one’s self-worth
at a trait level, that is, the use of more abstract construals
(Baumeister & Tice, 1985; Lyubomirsky, 2001). Further, as the
perceived probability of an event reduces, construals become more
abstract (Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006) such that
more negative expectations would engender more abstract constru-
als. Third, effective regulation of level of construal in response to
situational demands is hypothesized to require good cognitive and
central executive control. Thus, individuals with deficits in exec-
utive/inhibitory control, either because of greater cognitive load or
reduced cognitive resources, would be impaired at effectively
regulating level of construal in response to situational demands.
This analysis predicts that individuals with these vulnerability
factors will be compromised in their ability to flexibly regulate
level of construal in response to situational demands to the extent
that they do not show the functional shift toward lower level
construals typically observed in response to difficulties (Bless et
al., 1996; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Isbell, 2004; Kurman, 2003;
Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Given that patients with depression and
depressive ruminators are observed to have such meta-cognitive
beliefs (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Papageorgiou &
Wells, 2001; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001; Watkins & Moulds,
2005b), reduced self-esteem, and deficits in executive/inhibitory
control (R. N. Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Gotlib, Yue, &
Joormann, 2005; Hertel, 1997; Joormann, 2004, 2006), this anal-
ysis suggests the level-of-construal dysregulation hypothesis,
which predicts that depression-prone groups will be impaired at
regulating their level of construal in response to difficulties, lead-
ing to an overly abstract level of construal and to RT that has
unconstructive consequences. Consistent with this prediction, a
recent study found that individuals with mild-to-moderate depres-
sive symptoms generated counterfactual RT about a negative event
characterized by more concrete construals than those of non-
depressed individuals, whereas individuals with severe depressive
symptoms generated counterfactual RT characterized by more
abstract construals (e.g., global, characterological judgments).
Thus, mild depressive symptoms are associated with the adaptive
regulation of level of construal in response to mood, but more
extreme depressive symptoms are associated with dysregulation of
this process (Markman & Miller, 2006). Thus, this level-of-
construal dysregulation hypothesis accounts for why the subset of
individuals prone to depression and brooding show a tendency to
adopt RT characterized by more abstract construals, despite it
having unconstructive consequences.
The further test of the scientific utility of this elaborated control
theory approach to RT is its ability to make unique testable
predictions that can be evaluated in future research. The current
analysis has generated a number of such testable predictions. First,
as noted above, the level-of-construal dysregulation hypothesis
predicts that whereas the majority of individuals will preferentially
adopt higher level construals in unproblematic, familiar, positive,
and neutral situations, but will shift to lower level construals in the
face of difficulties and negative mood, individuals at risk for
depression will continue to preferentially adopt higher level con-
struals even in the face of difficulties and negative mood. Second,
as noted earlier, the elaborated control theory predicts an interac-
tion between level of construal and valence in determining the
consequences of RT. Lower level construals are predicted to be
more adaptive during RT focused on negative content or occurring
within a negative context, whereas higher level construals are
predicted to be more adaptive during RT focused on positive
content or occurring within a positive context. Thus, the use of
repeated training paradigms in which individuals learn to adopt a
more concrete level of construal in response to emotional events
would be predicted to reduce emotional vulnerability to a subse-
quent negative event but also to reduce positive response to a
subsequent positive event. Likewise, since people construe nearer
future events in more concrete terms than distant future events
(Forster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004; Liberman & Trope, 1998;
Trope & Liberman, 2003), focusing on nearer future events during
negatively valenced RT is predicted to result in more constructive
outcomes than focusing on distant future events, with the reverse
pattern of findings predicted for positively valenced RT.
Third, this approach has a number of implications for the treat-
ment of psychological disorders, since RT has been demonstrated
to contribute to both anxiety and depression (Harvey et al., 2004).
It suggests that when an individual starts to dwell on a negative
event or difficulty, shifts in how he or she does this could poten-
tially move him or her from RT that exacerbates difficulties to RT
that helps recovery. This analysis suggests that the goal of therapy
for people with unconstructive RT should not be to reduce their RT
but rather to shift them to more constructive forms of RT. Target-
ing such changes could contribute to more effective and systematic
treatments for psychological disorders. This analysis predicts that
RT with constructive consequences can be facilitated by (a) re-
ducing the extent and accessibility of negative thought content
while increasing the extent and accessibility of positive thought
content and (b) encouraging a shift into a more concrete level of
construal when focused on difficulties and negative mood (see
Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 1995, for a related analysis). These
predictions are consistent with a number of psychological thera-
pies empirically shown to be effective in treating depression and
anxiety. Both cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) and behavioral
activation implicitly encourage patients to be more concrete, spe-
cific, and detailed in their description and analysis of activities.
Further, in both therapies, patients work to build up success,
mastery, and pleasurable activities, and, thereby, improve self-
esteem and strengthen and make more accessible positive cogni-
tion. Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy, which has been dem-
onstrated to significantly reduce rates of relapse in people with a
history of recurrent depression in several trials (Ma & Teasdale,
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(Ramel, Goldin, Carmona, & McQuaid, 2004), explicitly uses
meditation practice to train patients away from abstract levels of
processing and into a more concrete mode of processing (Segal,
Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). Moreover, a recent adaptation of
CBT that explicitly focuses on shifting processing toward lower
level construals has encouraging initial results in the treatment of
residual depression, reducing symptoms and depressive rumina-
tion (Watkins et al., 2007).
These examples are illustrative rather than exhaustive. None-
theless, they demonstrate how the control theory can generate
unique, testable predictions as well as account for current knowl-
edge. The veracity of the account should be subject to evaluation
by the rigorous testing of these and other relevant predictions.
Future Research
Areas for Future Investigation
The current review also highlights important gaps in the re-
search on RT. First, the study of RT has been predominantly
focused on depression, worry, and trauma. Future research needs
to examine the processes of RT with respect to other psychological
disorders, other triggering events, and other emotions. Recent
findings linking RT prospectively to bulimia and substance abuse
in female adolescents (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2007) and concur-
rently to bipolar disorder (S. L. Johnson et al., in press) suggest the
value of further RT research in these disorders. Second, many of
the prospective studies of RT related to psychological disorders
have not explicitly reported or controlled for previous episodes of
the relevant disorder (e.g., major depression), which could poten-
tially act as a common variable, explaining why elevated RT
predicts future symptoms. Third, there is a preponderance of
research on RT with unconstructive consequences, which needs to
be balanced by more research into the constructive aspects of RT.
In particular, more prospective longitudinal studies and experi-
mental studies are necessary to investigate the constructive con-
sequences of RT, especially in the areas of cognitive processing
and posttraumatic growth, where most of the evidence is still only
cross-sectional. Fourth, such research requires behavioral, physi-
ological, or observer-rated outcome measures that reduce the risk
of constructive outcomes resulting from inaccurate, biased, or
defensive self-reports.
Fifth, a valuable addition to research in this field will be the
development of measures that can assess both constructive and
unconstructive aspects of RT, as well as RT across a wider range
of situations and moods. The limitations of the RSQ were noted
earlier: Future research will usefully assess RT using alternative
questionnaires (Siegle, Moore, & Thase, 2004) that do not con-
found RT with the degree of negative affectivity and that can
capture other potentially relevant dimensions such as the duration,
controllability, and repetitiveness of RT. Likewise, the assessment
of RT through non-self-report measures is a priority, such as
developing on-line measures of RT, such as the use of thought
sampling, or cognitive-experimental and psychophysiological in-
dices associated with self-reported RT, such as attentional bias
(Joorman et al., 2006), sustained pupil dilation to negative infor-
mation (Siegle, Granholm, Ingram, & Matt, 2001; Siegle, Stein-
hauer, Carter, Ramel, & Thase, 2003), or sustained event-related
fMRI amygdala activity in response to emotional words (Siegle,
Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002). Sixth, the process of
goal disengagement needs more detailed examination. Goal disen-
gagement and goal reengagement are increasingly suggested to be
important in determining well-being (Rasmussen, Wrosch,
Scheier, & Carver, 2006; Wrosch, Dunne, Scheier, & Schulz,
2006; Wrosch & Heckhausen, 1999; Wrosch et al., 2003; Wrosch,
Schulz, & Heckhausen, 2004) and, to date, are neglected in the
study of RT.
Other Possible Moderators of the Consequences of RT
This review focuses on factors that were robustly demonstrated
to moderate the consequences of RT. Nonetheless, there was
tentative evidence that several other factors may moderate the
consequences of RT. First, two correlational studies suggested that
the purpose motivating RT may moderate its consequences: RT
motivated by curiosity and by searching for new ideas and expe-
riences was associated with less negative affect/depression than
RT motivated by neurotic, threat-related concerns or by the need
for certainty (Segerstrom et al., 2003; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).
Prospective and experimental studies are necessary to explore
whether the purpose of RT may be a potential moderator. Second,
rigidity of thought during RT (e.g., perseveration on the same
content vs. generation of many different ideas) may be a potential
moderator of the consequences of RT. Several studies suggest that
the generation of an increased number of different thoughts and
ideas is associated with constructive consequences for RT (Cantor
et al., 1987; El Leithy et al., 2006), whereas RT defined in terms
of perseveration and Stagnant Deliberation is associated with
increased depression (Ehring, 2007; Feldman & Hayes, 2005).
Thus, RT that is highly repetitive, “stuck,” and perseverative may
be unconstructive. This suggestion parallels Ingram’s (1990) pro-
posal that pathological self-focus is characterized by excessive
frequency, sustained duration, and rigidity. By extension, it may be
useful to investigate whether frequency, duration, and repetitive-
ness of RT moderate the consequences of RT.
Conclusion
The analysis outlined here builds on many others and represents
ongoing efforts to identify the key mechanisms that influence the
different consequences of RT. In this article, I review evidence
indicating that RT can have unconstructive and constructive con-
sequences. In the course of reviewing the literature on RT, three
factors emerged to account for the differential consequences of
RT: the valence of thought content, the intrapersonal and situa-
tional context of the individual engaged in RT, and the construal
level of the RT. Table 3 describes how each of the major classes
of RT reviewed earlier can be characterized in terms of these
moderating factors. Thus, depressive rumination (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991) is characterized by negatively valenced thought
content (RT about depression), a negative intrapersonal context
(depressed mood, negative self-beliefs), and an abstract level of
construal (thinking about meanings and implications), with accom-
panying unconstructive consequences. Several classes of RT have
inclusive and broad definitions, such that they cannot be charac-
terized by a particular value for each factor (e.g., Martin & Tess-
er’s, 1989, 1996, definition of rumination encompasses positive vs.
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described as having unconstructive consequences and constructive
consequences. Within the current analysis, all worry is character-
ized by negative valence (thoughts of a real or potential problem),
but worry characterized by a concrete level of construal is con-
structive, whereas worry characterized by an abstract level of
construal and negative intrapersonal context (e.g., low problem-
solving confidence) is unconstructive. Moreover, although the
valence of the context typically matches the valence of thought
content, there are exceptions; for example, in problem solving and
defensive pessimism, thought content is negative (thoughts of a
problem) but intrapersonal context is positive, reflecting high
levels of optimism and positive self-belief. This analysis also
suggests that there may be two routes by which cognitive process-
ing could be constructive: Following a stressful event (negative
situational context), it could be useful to either focus on finding
benefits (positive content) in as abstract a way as possible or to
focus on the negative experience (negative content) in as concrete
and detailed a way as possible. It is important to acknowledge that,
although this mapping of function to classes of RT is consistent
with all the evidence reviewed, it is not a definitive account but
rather a preliminary framework to organize findings across the RT
literature, inform re-analysis of extant findings, and generate fur-
ther hypotheses.
The key messages of this article are twofold. First, the article
extends the explanatory power of previous theorizing about RT by
elaborating on the original control theory account of rumination
and suggests that the process of RT can be best understood within
this framework. As well as providing a theoretical framework to
guide future research, this approach has considerable implications
for understanding how thinking, action, and emotional state inter-
act. Second, this analysis is of particular relevance to answering
the important theoretical and applied question of how RT about
upsetting events sometimes leads to effective cognitive processing
and problem solving yet at other times exacerbates depression and
anxiety.
This review was not meant to be, and clearly could not be,
exhaustive. Given the breadth of the literature relevant to RT, it is
likely that other factors not mentioned here are compatible with
this analysis or could influence the consequences of RT. Further-
more, this review has focused on the processes and mechanisms
most directly linked to the different consequences of RT, at the
loss of detailed consideration of other factors potentially linked to
RT. In particular, biological, interpersonal, neuropsychological,
and neurological factors, such as the role of neurotransmitters,
functional deficits in inhibitory processes, and functional neuro-
anatomy, have not been reviewed (e.g., Mayberg, 2006; Ray et al.,
2005; Siegle et al., 2001). This is not to argue that these factors do
not play a role in influencing RT; it is probable that they do; rather
it reflects the fact that there is currently little evidence that these
processes influence the consequences of RT, which was the focus
of this review. Future research would usefully examine these
factors in relationship to the consequences of RT and, in particular,
with reference to the control theory elaborated here. Nonetheless,
I hope that the integrative framework elucidated here provides a
novel and useful theoretical organization that will facilitate re-
search on the mechanisms underpinning RT and also provides the
first tentative answers to the highly significant question of “What
determines whether RT leads to constructive or unconstructive
consequences?”
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